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In the late 1990s, the U.S. government ceded de facto technical and policy control over the Internet
domain name system (DNS) to a private non-profit company.  That company, the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), operates under various contracts to the US government, and
via additional contracts it has signed with registries and registrars.  ICANN acts as the de facto regulator
for DNS policy. In addition to technical policy coordination that prevents multiple registries from attempting
to deploy colliding top-level-domains (TLDs),4 ICANN also engages in policies that strongly resemble
traditional regulation of market structure.  It decides what TLDs will be made available to users, and which
registrars will be permitted to offer those TLDs for sale.  And it makes those decisions at least in part based
on the potential registrars' willingness to offer a package of services that includes mandatory trademark
arbitration.
ICANN's curious status as a quasi-non governmental organization with strong ties to the
government has occasioned a good deal of comment, much of it negative.5  Some of that comment has
focused on ICANN's rather fitful starts towards open and participatory governance of the DNS.6  Others
have questioned the legitimacy of handing important policy questions over to a private -- or at least mostly
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2private -- entity.7  In this article, we focus on a hitherto-neglected implication of ICANN's private status:
its potential liability under the U.S. antitrust laws, and the liability of those who transact with it.
ICANN finds itself on the horns of a dilemma.  It has some of the indicia of a government
corporation exercising authority granted to it by the Department of Commerce.8  If ICANN is therefore a
state entity, it is subject to both constitutional and statutory constraints on its regulatory authority -- notably
the requirement of due process and the burdens of the Administrative Procedures Act.9  ICANN's actions
to date are unlikely to satisfy those procedural constraints.  Both ICANN and the U.S. government argue
that ICANN is not subject to those rules because it is a private industry self-regulatory body.10  Although
one of us has argued that ICANN is best understood to be a state actor for constitutional law purposes,
the contrary argument that ICANN is private is not without merit. If ICANN is private, however, it follows
that both ICANN and private actors who have relationships with it, are subject to U.S. (and probably non-
US) antitrust law. 
Previous legal efforts to subject IANA and Network Solutions (NSI) to U.S. antitrust liability have
uniformly failed, in part because the courts concluded that the pre-ICANN DNS was run by state actors
or those (such as NSI) acting at their behest and was therefore immune from antitrust scrutiny.11  ICANN
argues, however, that it is not as closely tied to the government as NSI was in the days before ICANN was
created.  If this is correct, it seems likely that ICANN will not benefit from the same immunity.  Rather, it
will have to defend its actions on their competitive merits.  In this article we consider the antitrust
implications of ICANN's actions, both for it and for those who interact with it.
Some of ICANN's regulatory actions, although perhaps justified on other grounds, clearly raise
competitive concerns. For example, in the recent round of applications for new TLDs, ICANN made it a
prime requirement that applicants demonstrate that their proposals would not enable competitive (alternate)
roots. Similarly, ICANN prevents certain types of non-price competition among registrars by requiring that
they adhere to an ICANN dispute policy (the UDRP) that was, in substantial part, drafted by a lawyer hired
by a consortium of existing registrars.  ICANN's rules -- coupled with its de facto control over the DNS
-- may have the effect of restraining competition.
Further, the process by which those rules were adopted might be characterized as anticompetitive
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3collusion by existing registrars.  Those registrars will likely not be subject to the Noerr-Pennington lobbying
exemption that would shield them from antitrust immunity were ICANN a public body.12 ICANN sets these
and other policies within a structure that gives the 'regulated' a strong voice in the policies applied to them:
half of the ICANN Board seats are allocated under corporatist principles by representatives of industries
and groups potentially affected by ICANN's actions.
Whether ICANN has in fact violated the antitrust laws depends on whether it is an antitrust state
actor (even if it is not, by hypothesis, a state actor for purposes of constitutional law), whether the DNS is
an essential facility, on the extent of ICANN's government contractor immunity under an unusual zero-dollar
procurement contract, and on whether it can shelter under precedents that protect standard-setting bodies.
Particular attention under antitrust law will be paid to the extent to which the government has both clearly
articulated a policy direction for ICANN and actively supervised ICANN's performance of its duties. While
Congress is investigating ICANN right now, a plausible argument can be made that the government has
neither clearly articulated support for nor actively supervised ICANN's anticompetitive actions. If so, it will
be treated just as any other private market participant would be treated.
The exposure of those who take part in ICANN's constituencies, and which lobby ICANN in a
collective manner to impose rules on them and their competitors, depends in part on ICANN's status as
a quasi-state actor. It also depends on the nature of their conduct, how closely they coordinate behavior,
and the effect on competition.
If (as seems likely) a private ICANN and those who petition it are subject to antitrust law,
everyone involved in the process needs to review their conduct with an eye towards legal liability. ICANN
should act very differently with respect to both the UDRP and the competitive roots if it is to avoid
restraining trade. Whether ICANN's UDRP and competitive root policies are desirable is another matter,
one on which the authors do not necessarily agree.  But if ICANN's policies are in fact desirable, then it
seems clear that the government must take a more active role both in setting those policies and in supervising
their implementation, either by exercising control over ICANN or by replacing it with a true governmental
decision-maker.
In Part I, we briefly review ICANN's history and its relationship to the U.S. government.  In Part
II, we discuss the antitrust state action doctrine, and how that doctrine has been applied in the past to the
DNS.  In Part III, we focus on two ICANN policies that are potentially anticompetitive:  its restriction on
the deployment of new TLDs and its decision to require a uniform arbitration procedure for resolving
trademark disputes.  Finally, in Part IV we consider the liability of other private parties who petition
ICANN to set its policies.
Part I: ICANN in a Nutshell
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4ICANN is a complicated answer to two problems, one technical and one political.  The technical
problem results from the architecture of the domain name system (DNS) on which the smooth functioning
of the Internet relies.  The Internet is a giant network of machines that use common protocols to
communicate with one another.  Every resource on the network has a unique address, called an IP
number.13  Because IP numbers are hard for people to remember, Internet standards provide for the
creation of mnemonic names for resources.   The DNS is the name given to the complex system for
registering those mnemonics -- domain names -- and maintaining the vast distributed, highly cached,
directories that permit every browser pointed at a URL to look up the correct IP number and deliver an
Internet communication, and every email to reach its destination.  The act of looking up a domain name and
retrieving the associated IP numbers called name resolution.
The original design of the DNS assumed that there would be one hierarchically organized set of
domain names, and that every domain name in it would be unique.  Unique domain names ensure that every
user of the Internet who types a particular URL will find that it resolves to the same IP number associated
with that URL, and thus allows a connection to the same resource.  The failure to ensure uniqueness -- to
allow a condition where different users typing the same thing get routed to different IP numbers -- has been
called a “name collision” or, more pejoratively, “instability of the Internet”.  To avoid these problems, the
DNS relies on a system of layered registrations.  In what is sometimes called the legacy DNS - the DNS
that today almost everyone uses -- there is one master file called the root file that lists the approved top
level domains (TLDs).  Each line in this file contains the name of a TLD and the IP number of a computer
that has the authoritative registry for that TLD.   The root file is copied by the thirteen root servers, which
are the computers that actually resolve any TLD queries that cannot be resolved in hierarchically organized,
cached, databases closer to the user. 
So long as everyone relies on the same family of hierarchically organized databases, whoever
controls the root file enjoys the power to determine which TLDs are accessible to the entire Internet, and
what registry’s database will be considered the authoritative source of information for that TLD.  The
database of registrations in each TLD is in turn controlled by a single registry.14  In contrast, today a group
of highly competitive registrars provide the service of selling actual entries, or registrations, into the
registries.  To get the right to use a domain name,15 a registrant in a gTLD first must find an available name.
 She then pays a registrar to inscribe her name, contact information, and IP number in the registry.  Domain
names in .com, .org, and .net are allocated on a first-come, first-serve basis; names in the newer gTLDs
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5will be allocated in more complex fashions that give priority to trademark holders, and also seek to level
the playing field for similarly situated applicants competing for a name during the initial “landrush” period
when registrations open.16
Thus, the legacy DNS system has two chokepoints: whoever controls the root controls which, and
how many, TLDs will be accessible to the vast majority of Internet users.  And, while there can be many
competing registrars, and many TLDs competing with each other, each TLD must have one master registry.
The existence of these chokepoints over the legacy root created a political problem.  In effect,
whoever controlled the root file controlled both whether a given TLD could be part of the Internet and who
got the potentially lucrative job of running the TLD’s registry.  And, by 1997, these were increasingly
controversial questions--questions that had landed in the lap of the U.S. government, which found itself
controlling the root.17
 From the viewpoint of high level policy makers, this power was a not-entirely-welcome accident.
 A series of largely informal arrangements, mostly coordinated by one person, Dr. Jon Postel, and
supported by a series of first military, then National Science Foundation contracts,18 had morphed into
something unforeseen, important, and increasingly controversial.  DNS management, notably the registration
of names in .com, the most popular gTLD, had taken on a commercial life of its own due to an explosion
of interest in the Internet.  Thanks in part to marketing efforts by Network Solutions Inc. (NSI) -- which
enjoyed a government-granted monopoly on selling domain name registrations in the three major gTLDs,
.com, .org and .net -- as new users flooded onto the Internet they registered millions of domain names. 
Meanwhile, however, the very informal, consensus-driven, and perhaps unsophisticated method for creating
new gTLDs broke down under the strain of competing interests.   Registrars wishing to compete with NSI
chafed at its contractual government monopoly, and at its monopolistic practices.   Users who were not first
to the Internet wanted new, short, domain names, and new gTLDs to register them in if the ones in the
existing gTLDs (and especially .com) were already taken.   Trademark holders, waking up to the marketing
and commercial potential of the Internet, wanted controls on the ability of others to register words that
paralleled or resembled their marks.  Registrants accused of cybersquatting wanted a less-draconian
method of dealing with such charges than NSI’s policy of simply de-activating their domain name pending
the (slow, sometimes endlessly deferred) resolution of the dispute. 
Whether there should be new top-level domain names was especially controversial.  Although it is
easy for the DNS system controller to create new world-readable gTLDs,19 and indeed Dr. Postel
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6proposed creating hundreds, intellectual property rights holders objected to additional gTLDs, arguing with
some justification that they already faced mounting problems from cybersquatters--speculators who
registered domain names corresponding to trademarks and sought to resell them to the trademark holders
for profit.20 Meanwhile, foreign governments, and especially the European Union, began to express
understandable concern about the United States’ control of a critical element of a global communication and
commercial resource on which they foresaw their economies and societies becoming ever-more
dependent.21
In June, 1998, a task force headed by Senior Presidential Adviser Ira Magaziner issued the
Statement of Policy on the Privatization of Internet Domain Name System, known as the DNS White
Paper.22  The White Paper called for the government to transition its control of the DNS to a private
corporation identified only as ‘NewCo’.  The White Paper did not actually mandate the creation of this
corporation, but -- nicely skirting the prohibitions of the Government Corporation Control Act23 -- only said
how nice it would be if someone would form it to undertake certain specified tasks so that the government
could strike a deal with it.24  And, not quite fortuitously, a group of worthies did just that, forming a
California non-profit corporation called ICANN, and the government duly recognized ICANN as NewCo.
ICANN’s subsequent three-year history has been fraught with controversy, but only a few facets
of that history need to be related: (1) The extent to which ICANN is controlled by the government, which
is relevant to its status as a potential antitrust state actor; (2) the extent to which registries and registrars
control ICANN and/or are controlled by it, which speaks to how they might be using ICANN to collude
in anticompetitive conduct; (3) two specific instances of ICANN-imposed policies which well affect
competition: the UDRP, which limits service competition among registrars, and the means by which ICANN
has constrained the introduction of new TLDs, which affects competition between registries.
1. ICANN’s Relationship with the Federal Government
ICANN is formally independent of the federal government.  Its 18-person Board of Directors
currently consists of four hold-over directors from the original nine self-selected incorporators, five directors
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7elected in a somewhat controversial process25 from each of five geographical world regions, and nine
directors appointed by three different functional groups established by ICANN on corporatist lines.26  Other
than having anointed ICANN as its DNS representative, and thus approving the original incorporators, the
US government has had no formal input into the selection of ICANN’s directors.  Like some thirty-plus
other governments, the US government participates in the quarterly meetings of ICANN’s government
advisory committee (GAC).  ICANN’s rules give the GAC a right of consultation and a right to advise, but
do not require ICANN to follow its instructions.27
ICANN’s direct relationship with the U.S. government is defined by five elements: The White
Paper, three separate government contracts, and a less formal but highly significant component made up
of DoC’s recognition of ICANN as the entity contemplated in the White Paper plus whatever continuing
supervision the Department of Commerce (DoC) may choose to exercise over its contractor.
The White Paper.  Although, as a mere policy statement, the White Paper had no direct legal force,
its very vagueness on key points makes it the closest thing to a consensus document produced on DNS
matters in the last four years.   In June 1999, ICANN stated that the White Paper “principles ... have
dictated ICANN’s policy decisions to date.”28  More recently, DoC reaffirmed the White Paper’s centrality
to DNS policy,29 as has ICANN’s Vice President and General Counsel.30  The White Paper instructed
ICANN to undertake specific tasks, including fostering competition among registrars, and attacking the
cybersquatting issue.31  From its creation as the body seeking to be anointed as NewCo to present day,
ICANN has assiduously undertaken to accomplish each of the specific goals set out in the White Paper.
The White Paper opined that NewCo “should be headquartered in the United States, and
incorporated in the U.S. as a not-for-profit corporation. It should, however, have a board of directors from
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8around the world”32 and ICANN complied.  The White Paper said that NewCo should take over the
existing IANA staff, and ICANN, with DoC’s cooperation, later did just that.  NewCo, said the White
Paper, should have the authority to “[s]et policy for and direct allocation of IP number blocks to regional
Internet number registries” and “[o]versee operation of the authoritative Internet root server system”33 plus
[o]versee policy for determining the circumstances under which new TLDs are added to the root system”
while coordinating “the assignment of other Internet technical parameters as needed.”34  If DoC’s contracts
with ICANN did not necessarily give it this authority directly, they created the conditions in which ICANN
could, with DoC’s at least tacit blessing, exercise it for all practical purposes.
The White Paper’s specific policy directions included a requirement that NewCo require specified
information about domain name registrants be included in all registry databases and freely available on the
Internet in order to allow trademark holders to “contact a domain name registrant when a conflict arises
between a trademark holder and a domain name holder.”35 Registrants should be required to pay fees at
the time of registration, and required to “agree to submit infringing domain names to the authority of a court
of law in the jurisdiction in which the registry, registry database, registrar, or the ‘A’ root servers are
located.”36 NewCo should also require registrants to agree to arbitration in cases of alleged cybersquatting37
and give special protections for famous trademarks.38  With the exception of the special protection for
famous marks, which foundered on an inability to agree on how to identify which marks were sufficiently
famous, ICANN quickly implemented each of these directives.
The White Paper also prescribed a structure for NewCo’s board of directors.  The Board “should
be balanced to equitably represent the interests of IP number registries, domain name registries, domain
name registrars, the technical community, Internet service providers (ISPs), and Internet users (commercial,
not-for-profit, and individuals) from around the world”39 but government officials would be forbidden to
serve on the board. The interim board would “develop policies for the addition of TLDs, and establish the
qualifications for domain name registries and domain name registrars within the system.”40  ICANN faithfully
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9followed most of these directions, although it took a long time to elect user representatives, and opinions
differ on whether even today users and non-profits are equitably represented on the Board.
The Three Contracts.  Formally, the federal government administers its relationship with ICANN
via three agreements: (1) a Memorandum of Understanding,41 (2) a Cooperative Research and
Development Agreement (CRADA);42 and (3) an unusual no-cost, no-bid “procurement” contract for the
“IANA function”.
The MoU.   The MoU was DoC’s first agreement with ICANN, signed even before DoC
recognized ICANN as NewCo.  DoC and ICANN agreed to “jointly design, develop, and test the
mechanisms, methods, and procedures that should be in place and the steps necessary to transition
management responsibility for DNS functions now performed by, or on behalf of, the U.S. Government to
a private-sector not-for-profit entity” in order to prepare the ground for the transition of DNS management
to ICANN.43 The “DNS management functions” included oversight of both “the operation of the
authoritative root server system” and “the policy for determining the circumstances under which new top-
level domains would be added to the root system,” plus any other agreed activities “necessary to coordinate
the specified DNS management functions.”44 Echoing the White Paper, the DoC-ICANN MoU also listed
four principles by which the parties “will abide”: stability of the Internet; competition; private, bottom-up
coordination; and representation.45  The MoU appears to authorize no more than a study of how the DNS
would be privatized in the future. In fact, however, the DoC-ICANN MoU conveyed very significant
authority, because the means by which ICANN would “study” the future privatization of the DNS was by
acting as if the DNS were already privatized.46
A year later, DoC and ICANN amended the MoU. ICANN promised not to amend its standard
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form agreement with Registries without DoC’s prior approval.  ICANN also promised not to make
agreements with a successor registry without DoC’s approval and to follow DoC’s lead if it chose to
replace NSI with a new registry. And most importantly (in that it gave DoC additional leverage over
ICANN), ICANN agreed that “[ i]f DOC withdraws its recognition of ICANN or any successor entity by
terminating this MOU, ICANN agrees that it will assign to DOC any rights that ICANN has in all existing
contracts with registries and registrars.”47  Whether this "termination" language would apply if the agreement
were allowed to lapse instead of being actively ended by DoC is an interesting question; the ambiguity may
give ICANN leverage in any contract negotiations.
The IANA Procurement. DoC issued a sole source contract to ICANN for the IANA function
on the grounds that ICANN was the only responsible source available.48 DoC duly issued a purchase order
to ICANN for IANA services, a purchase order that has a price of zero dollars but allows ICANN to
establish and collect fees from third parties, subject to review by DoC, so long as the fees reflect the actual
cost of providing the service.49
The CRADA.  In the ICANN-DoC MoU, the parties had agreed that ICANN would study the
privatization of the DNS by doing it. However, IANA, a separate government contractor, was already
doing the job that ICANN proposed to privatize.50   In the June 1999 Cooperative Research and
Development Agreement (CRADA)51 DoC engaged ICANN to study how to improve the IANA functions.
 Again, like the ICANN-DoC MoU, this new agreement appears to include having ICANN perform the
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50   A copy of what appears to be an agreement between that contractor, USC, and ICANN, dated January 1, 1999, appears
as Appendix 21 to ICANN’s application for tax-exempt status. See Form 1023 (Appendix 21), at
http://www.icann.org/financials/tax/us/appendix-21.htm (last modified Sept. 4, 2000); see also Form 1023 (Appendix 19),
at http://www.icann.org/financials/tax/us/appendix-19.htm (last modified Sept. 4, 2000) (detailing a loanout agreement for
two employees)
51   A CRADA is usually an agreement in which, as the United States Geological Survey explained:
     [t]he collaborating partner agrees to provide funds, personnel, services, facilities, equipment or other resources needed
to conduct a specific research or development effort while the Federal government agrees to provide similar resources
but not funds directly to the partner. . . . The CRADA vehicle provides incentives that can help speed the
commercialization of Federally-developed technology, making it an excellent technology transfer tool.
     What Is a CRADA?, United States Geological Survey, at http://www.usgs.gov/tech-transfer/ what-crada.html (last
modified May 23, 1997).
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function during the study.52
Ongoing supervision  DoC’s supervision of ICANN has three visible forms. 
First, DoC’s contracts with ICANN and NSI (VeriSign) require NSI to secure written instructions
from DoC before making changes in the root file.53  Thus, any of ICANN’s recommendations on new
TLDs require at least rubber-stamp approval from DoC; while this might be thought to provide an occasion
for review it has not in fact done so.  Indeed, in a recent letter denying a petition for rulemaking on the
subject of new gTLDs, DoC reiterated that, following the White Paper, DoC would as a matter of policy
approve ICANN’s decisions without subjecting them to review.54
Second, DoC’s MoU with ICANN provides for oversight and cooperation, although from the
outside it often is difficult to tell how much of this there is at any given moment.   ICANN sends DoC an
annual report about its performance under the MoU.55  DoC promised to devote more than a quarter of
a million dollars in staff time56 and expenses to monitoring and helping ICANN.  DoC’s accounts of the
actual intensity of this effort have varied.  A DoC official testified that “[t]he Department’s general oversight
under the joint project is limited to ensuring that ICANN’s activities are in accordance with the joint project
MOU, which in turn requires ICANN to perform its MOU tasks in accordance with the White Paper.”57
But, when pressed for specifics, DoC stated that it “consults” with ICANN before its major decisions, such
as ICANN’s proposal to charge a fee of $1 per domain name.58  DoC clearly supported ICANN during
its first thirteen months by pressuring its other contractor, NSI, to recognize ICANN.59  Since then, it has
                                                
52   See CRADA, supra  note 42;  GAO Report, supra  note 48, at 18.
53   See Cooperative Agreement No. NCR-9218742, Amendment 11,  http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/internic/
cooperative-agreement/amendment11.html (Oct. 6, 1998).
54   "In July 1998, the Department of Commerce made it clear that it would not participate in the selection process of new
TLDs as set forth in the Statement of Policy, entitled Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741
(1998). In the Statement of Policy, the Department recognized that the selection of new TLDs should be conducted by
the private sector through a not-for-profit organization, globally representative of the Internet stakeholder community.
The Department recognized ICANN as that organization in November 1998 through a Memorandum of Understanding."
Letter from John F. Sopko, Acting Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information to William H. Bode (June 25,
2001), reprinted at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=237.
55   First status report; Second Status Report Under ICANN/US Government Memorandum of Understanding (30 June
2000), http://www.icann.org/general/statusreport-30jun00.htm (June 30, 2000);  Third Annual Status Report to the US
Department of Commerce, http://www.icann.org/general/statusreport-03jul01.htm
56   DoC promised half-time dedication of four or five full-time employees. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note
41, at 7.
57   Pincus, supra note 43.
58   See id.; see also  GAO Report, supra  note 48, at 23 (discussing the cooperation between ICANN and DoC regarding
the above-mentioned fee).
59   See, for example, DoC’s statement that:
     Network Solutions has indicated that it is not obligated to enter into a contract with ICANN because the Department
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been harder to gauge the intensity of the department’s oversight, barring the occasional extraordinary
intervention into ICANN’s affairs.  Indeed, DoC has occasionally intervened publicly in ICANN’s affairs,
such as its month-long review and ultimate amendment of ICANN’s proposed renegotiation of its
agreement with VeriSign, undertaken after some prodding by Congress.60  Most recently, DoC Secretary
Donald Evans wrote to ICANN urging it to approve more top-level domain names soon,61 although it is
not clear if this letter had, or even was intended to have, any direct effect.
Perhaps most important, but least visible, is the sword of Damocles that DoC holds over ICANN’s
head.  ICANN’s powers stem from its contracts, and its recognition by DoC as the “‘NewCo” specified
in the White Paper.  The original MoU allowed DoC to terminate the agreement on September 30, 2000,
or after 120 days’ notice, and subsequent extensions have had similar provisions.62  As all the DoC-
ICANN contracts run require annual or semi-annual renewal, they provide a means for DoC to pressure
ICANN were it to choose to do so.  In theory, DoC could transfer its imprimatur from ICANN to another
body, although in practice this seems a remote possibility. 
2. Registries’ and Registrars’ Structural Relationships With ICANN
Adhering, more or less, to the White Paper’s directions regarding the internal organization of
NewCo,63 ICANN created three subsidiary councils charged with developing policy and making
recommendations to the Board.  Each of these three groups also elected three of the ICANN Board’s 18
directors.  One of these three bodies, the Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO) is charged with
concentrating on domain name related issues.  The DNSO gives registrars (and, now that there are more
than one, gTLD registries) a place to meet, to lobby ICANN, and to exert some influence on the selection
of its directors.
The DNSO is sub-divided into seven ‘stakeholder’ constituencies selected by the nine initial self-
selected ICANN directors: registrars,64 gTLD registries, ccTLDs, ISPs, trademark holders, businesses,
                                                                                                                                                            
of Commerce has not “recognized” ICANN by transferring authority over the authoritative root system to it. We find no
merit in this argument. The Department of Commerce entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN on
November 25, 1998. That MOU constitutes the Government’s “recognition” of ICANN. We reiterated this point in a letter
to Network Solutions on February 26, 1999.
     Pincus, supra  note 43.
60   http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=159; Commerce Ensures Competitiveness and Stability are Protected in
New ICANN-VeriSign Agreement, http://osecnt13.osec.doc.gov/public.nsf/docs/icann-verisign-0518; Statement by
Department of Commerce General Counsel Ted Kassinger Regarding the Proposed Verisign-Icann Agreement,
http://osecnt13.osec.doc.gov/public.nsf/docs/Kassinger-on-ICANN-Verisign
61   Letter from Donald L. Evans, U.S. Secretary of Commerce, to Vint Cerf (25 May 2001), http://www.icann.org/
correspondence/doc-to-icann-25may01.htm
62   See Memorandum of Understanding, supra  note *, ' VII.
63   See White Paper, supra  note 22.
64   Oddly, future registrars were allowed to enter the registrars’ constituency and vote before they were accredited by
ICANN, but future registries were not.
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and non-commercial domain name holders.65  Each of the seven constituencies elects three66 representatives
to the DNSO’s governing body, the Names Council, which in turn elects three representatives to the
ICANN Board.  The registrars’ strength may be greater than it seems, however, since registrars could join
more than one constituency simultaneously.  Indeed, a single firm could simultaneously be a member of four:
commercial and business entities; ISP and connectivity providers; registrars; and trademark, other
intellectual property, and anti-counterfeiting interests.67  Thus, in theory, registrars could influence a majority
of the votes on the Names Council, which in turn might allow them to choose three of ICANN’s directors.
ICANN has substantial power over registrars, as its non-negotiable standard form Registrar
Agreement requires them to pledge to observe ICANN’s policy decisions,68 and also gives ICANN the
power to disqualify a registrar.69  gTLD Registries must make a similar pledge to follow ICANN’s
consensus policies, but as their contracts are each unique, ICANN also is able to impose additional
requirements on the new gTLDs before allowing them to join the legacy root.   ICANN’s control does not
(yet) extend to the ccTLD registries, although ICANN is currently negotiating agreements with them as well.
ICANN’s control over the registrars stems in part from its agreements with the registries.  In
particular, ICANN’s agreement with NSI, the monopoly gTLD registry until the forthcoming introduction
of .biz, .info and other new gTLDs, requires NSI to ensure that registrars accept ICANN’s standard form
Registrar Agreement,70 before allowing them to register any names.  And the chief consensus policy
grandfathered into the NSI Registry Agreement is ICANN’s mandatory arbitration clause for domain name
disputes, the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).71
                                                
65   See The seven constituencies official names are: ccTLD registries; commercial and business entities; gTLD registries;
ISP and connectivity providers; noncommercial domain name holders; registrars; and trademark, other intellectual
property, and anti-counterfeiting interests. See About DNSO, Domain Name Supporting Organization, at
http://www.dnso.org/dnso/aboutdnso.html; cf. Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE
L.J. 187,  238 & n.261 (2000).
66   ICANN stripped one of the seven DNSO constituencies,, the gTLD constituency, of two of its three Names Council
 Representatives because there was only one firm, NSI/VeriSign, represented in the constituency.  The full three-member
representation is due to be restored when new gTLD registries join the constituency.
67   See By-Laws of the Intellectual Property Constituency, § III, Intellectual Property Constituency, at
http://ipc.songbird.com/IPC_Bylaws_dec_15_correct.htm (Nov. 30, 1999); Commercial and Business Entities
Constituency Charter, § II.A, Business Constituency Domain Name Supporting Organization, at http://www.
bcdnso.org/Charter.htm (Oct. 25, 1999); The DNSO Registrar Constituency , § II, Domain Name Supporting Organization,
at http://www.dnso.org/constituency/registrars/Registrars.Articles.html; ISPs and Connectivity Providers, How to
Become a Member, Domain Name Supporting Organization, at http://www.dnso.org/constituency/ispcp/membership.html.
68   Registrar Accreditation Agreement,  http://www.icann.org/nsi/icann-raa-04nov99.htm (Nov. 4, 1999)
69'   ICANN, Statement Of Registrar Accreditation Policy, § II.C.  http://www.icann.org/policy_statement.html#IIC
70   See ICANN-NSI Registry Agreement, http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-registry-agreement-04nov99.htm (Nov. 4, 1999);
Registrar Accreditation Agreement, at http://www.icann.org/nsi/icann-raa-04nov99.htm
71   ICANN, Registrar Accreditation Agreement, http://www.icann.org/nsi/icann-raa-04nov99.htm § II.K (Nov. 4, 1999).
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3. ICANN Policies With Competitive Implications
(a)  UDRP
The White Paper recommended that NewCo require registrants to agree “that in cases involving
cyberpiracy or cybersquatting (as opposed to conflicts between legitimate competing rights holders), they
would submit to and be bound by alternative dispute resolution systems identified by the new corporation
for the purpose of resolving those conflicts.”72  The White Paper itself said little about what this dispute
resolution policy should look like, choosing instead to ask the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), to advise NewCo on a plan.  WIPO duly did just that,73 and once it had WIPO’s advisory report
in hand ICANN wasted no time in starting its cumbersome policy-making machinery to address this issue.
 A “working group” was formed to consider the issues, and eventually recommended that some sort of
WIPO-like policy was appropriate.74 
Meanwhile, however, the registrars became impatient with the slow rate of progress of the working
group process.  In 1999, ICANN had begun accrediting new registrars who wished to compete with NSI.
 Although ICANN initially proposed a fairly detailed intellectual property protection regime,75 in March,
1999 the Board adopted a policy that mostly put the question off until it decided what it should do with
WIPO’s recommendations.76
As they prepared to go live in the so-called ‘testbed’ phase in mid-1999, the newly accredited
registrars found themselves in a delicate position.  On the one hand, the trademark interests were telling
them that they faced exposure to liability if they didn’t institute some method of protecting trademark holders
                                                
72   White Paper, supra  note 22, at 31,750.
73   WIPO, The Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues: Final Report of the WIPO
Internet Domain Name Process.
74   Working groups are supposed to be open to all comers; in fact, however, at least one of these groups was manipulated
to exclude opponents of mandatory arbitration.  See A. Michael Froomkin, Comments on ICANN Uniform Dispute Policy:
A Catalog of Critical Process Failures; Progress on Substance; More Work Needed, at 
http://www.law.miami.edu/~amf/icannudp.htm (Oct. 13, 1999).
75   In the Proposed Accreditation Guidelines for Registrars, ICANN stated that the final document “should protect legal
rights (including intellectual property rights) of the parties, and of third parties where applicable. It should contain
provisions that minimize disputes over rights to use of particular domain names, and in the event of dispute, it should
contain provisions that enhance the orderly and timely resolution of disputes.”
http://www.icann.org/singapore/draftguidelines.htm at § I.D.3 (February 8, 1999).  Section K of  this document also
contained a list of WIPO recommendations that ICANN thought should be incorporated into the Registries’ practices.
76   “During the term of the accreditation agreement, the registrar will have in place a policy and procedure for resolution
of disputes concerning SLD names. In the event that ICANN establishes a policy or procedure for resolution of disputes
concerning SLD names that by its terms applies to the registrar, the registrar will adhere to the policy or procedure.”
ICANN, STATEMENT OF REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION POLICY (.com, .net, and .org top-level domains) (Adopted
March 4, 1999) http://www.icann.org/policy_statement.html#IIIK.
This clause became § III.J. of the Registrar Accreditation Agreement,
http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-12may99.htm.
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against cybersquatters.  On the other hand, the policy then used by NSI was obviously draconian and
unfair.77  The registrars, perhaps with ICANN’s encouragement, decided to draft their own dispute policy.
 By May, 1999 the ICANN staff reported to the Board that “the [Registrar Accreditation] Agreement calls
for registrars to adopt dispute resolution policies, and that accredited registrars are already working together
to do so. Counsel noted that Network Solutions' registry-registrar contract also calls for registrars to have
dispute resolution policies in place, and that registrars are anxious to have guidance on a uniform policy.”78
The Registrars’ desire to have a tough and uniform policy was exacerbated by political and
competitive factors.  By the time the new registrars entered the scene, the conventional wisdom increasingly
was that ‘the best names are taken’.  The registrars as a group were therefore desperately anxious to have
new product to sell - registrations in new gTLDs in which they would be competing more evenly with NSI.
 They also believed, not without reason, that trademark owners had a virtual veto over the creation of new
gTLDs, and that they would exercise it until they were satisfied by the intellectual property protections
instituted by the registrars.  This created a powerful incentive to draft a tough policy on cybersquatting in
order to placate the trademark owners.
Tough wasn’t enough.  In order to satisfy the trademark interests the policy also had to be uniform
- to apply to all accredited registrars, and on all registrants.  Indeed, the registrars themselves had a vested
interest in ensuring that the policy applied to all their competitors, and especially their competitors’
customers, else they feared some registrar might compete on service terms and attract disproportionate
business by being ‘registrant friendly’ -- or worse, ‘cybersquatter friendly’.  This fear was far from
academic, as prior to ICANN’s UDRP, registrars had a variety of policies in place.79
Even before the first ICANN working group on domain name arbitration reported in late July
1999,80 a group of registrars81 quietly employed a Skadden Arps lawyer, Rita Rodin, to craft a dispute
policy for them.  On August 20,1999, the registrars unveiled their proposed policy document.82  Four days
                                                
77   See Carl Oppedahl, How Is a Domain Name Like a Cow?, 15 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 437 (1997).
78   ICANN, Minutes, Meeting of the Initial Board, May 27, 1999, http://www.icann.org/minutes/berlinminutes.html
79   See  http://www.domainhandbook.com/dompol.html.  As NSI was the registry, they were all de facto subject to its
policies, although there was a legal question as to liability for NSI’s actions in the absence of privity with the customer.
80   See WG-A  Final Report to the Names Council - July 29, 1999 - REVISED DRAFT,
http://www.dnso.org/dnso/notes/19990729.WGA -report.html.
81   By August, 1999 this group of 20 or so registrars apparently included Alibanza, AOL, AT&T, AITcom, CORE,
Domainbank, FICPI,  Infonetworks, Interq-Japan, Netnames, NSI, PSI Japan, Register.com plus the ICC and INTA .  See
POLICY STATEMENT REGARDING THE MODEL DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE POLICY,
http://www.dnso.org/constituency/registrars/Website/udrp-draft-19990909.html.  The official Registrars’ Statement
offered a slightly different list of Participating Registrars, Alabanza, Inc., America Online Incorporated, Animus
Communications, Inc., Domain Bank, Inc., EnetRegistry.com Corporation, eNOM, Inc., InfoNetworks, Inc., Melbourne
IT, Network Solutions, Inc., Nominalia Internet S.L., register.com, Tech Dogs, Inc., TUCOWS.com, Inc., and WebTrends
Corporation.  ICANN, Registrars' Statement Regarding Their Model Uniform Dispute Policy (Posted August 20, 1999),
http://www.icann.org/santiago/registrar-policy-statement.htm.
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later, the ICANN staff issued a report with its own detailed suggestions about what the dispute policy
should look like, many of which followed the registrars’ lead.83  Two days after that, amidst much
controversy, the ICANN Board was resolved to use the registrars’ draft, rather than anything drafted
through the ICANN consensus policymaking procedure “as a starting point” for the drafting of ICANN’s
own policy.84  In practice this meant that the Registrars’ draft was accepted almost in toto, save that a few
of the most controversial issues were referred to a ‘small drafting committee’ made up of representatives
of the warring factions.85  This committee was only advisory, and the staff did not accept all of its suggestion
even when it was able to reach consensus.86  Ultimately, ICANN staff prepared the final draft of the UDRP,
a text that owed a great deal to the registrars’ draft, which in turn relied on some of WIPO’s suggestions.87
 (b) Constrained Roll-out of New TLDs
                                                                                                                                                            
82   The Registrars’ policy was unveiled on Aug 20, and voted on by the ICANN Board on five days later. See ICANN
Staff Report: Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for gTLD Registrars,
http://www.icann.org/santiago/udrp-staff-report.htm.
83   ICANN Staff Report: Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for gTLD Registrars,
http://www.icann.org/santiago/udrp-staff-report.htm (Aug. 24, 1999).
84   See Resolution 99.83(1), http://www.icann.org/santiago/santiago-resolutions.htm.
85   The Board resolution, id., stated:
     FURTHER RESOLVED [99.82] that the President is directed, with the assistance of ICANN staff and counsel, to
prepare implementation documents for approval by the Board after public notice and comment, on a schedule that allows
the policy to be put into place within 45 days.
     FURTHER RESOLVED [99.83] that the Board gives the following guidance as to the preparation of the implementation
documents:
     1. The registrars' Model Dispute Resolution Policy should be used as a starting point;
     2. The President or his delegate should convene a small drafting committee including persons selected by him to
express views and consider the interests of the registrar, non-commercial, individual, intellectual property, and business
interests;
     3. In addition to the factors mentioned in paragraph 171(2) of the WIPO report, the following should be considered
in determining whether a domain name was registered in bad faith:
          (a) Whether the domain name holder is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the mark, without intent
to misleadingly divert consumers for commercial gain or to tarnish the mark
          (b) Whether the domain name holder (including individuals, businesses, and other organizations) is commonly
known by the domain name, even if the holder has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; and
          (c) Whether, in seeking payment for transfer of the domain name, the domain name holder has limited its request
for payment to its out-of-pocket costs.
     4. There should be a general parity between the appeal rights of complainants and domain name holders.
     5. The dispute policy should seek to define and minimize reverse domain name hijacking.
86   See Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm (Oct. 24, 1999) .
87   Id.  For a detailed discussion of the UDRP’s genesis and content see A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy”--Causes and Partial Cures (forthcoming),
http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/udrp.pdf.
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ICANN selected the first seven new gTLDs for inclusion in the legacy root at its second Annual
Meeting in Los Angeles from a crowded and highly contentious field of 47 applicants, each of whom had
paid a non-refundable $50,000 fee to have their applications considered.88  In one sense, the November,
2000 decision was the culmination of almost two years of effort; in another, it was only the start of another
nine or more month of tough bargaining over the contract terms that would bind each registry to ICANN,
some of which continues currently.  After each contract is painstakingly negotiated, ICANN submits the
gTLD to DoC; the first approvals happened within a few hours of the submission, suggesting that DoC’s
review was somewhat cursory.89
Breaking the logjam that had prevented any new gTLDs from joining the root90 was of course of
the main reasons why DoC wanted ICANN to exist, and why it contracted with it.  ICANN’s internal
processes leading up to the selection of new gTLDs reflected the divisions in the various affected
communities, the details of which need not concern us here.  At no time prior to its decision to approve only
a limited number of new TLDs did ICANN issue an opinion explaining the technical justification for this (or
any other) limit.  Nor did ICANN refer to such a report by anyone else.  In fact, so far was we can discern,
no such study, report or analysis existed then, or exists now.  ICANN’s decision was fundamentally
political:   an ICANN working group brokered a deal between the faction that wanted a very large number
of new TLDs, and those who wanted none.  In April 1999, the DNSO Names Council voted to
"recommend to the Board that a limited number of new top-level domains be introduced initially and that
the future introduction of additional top-level domains be done only after careful evaluation of the initial
introduction."91 In so doing, it endorsed the recommendation of that Working Group, which had
compromised on "six to ten, followed by an evaluation period."92
ICANN’s decision to limit the number of new gTLDs to well below the lowest estimates of what
the DNS could handle reduced the possible competition between registries.  ICANN justified it on the
grounds of compromise, but also on the grounds that it had been a long time since a new gTLD had been
introduced, and there might therefore be Internet ‘stability’ issues to consider that required a ‘test’ or ‘proof
                                                
88   http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-16nov00.htm#SecondAnnualMeeting.
     "The selected TLD proposals are of two types. Four proposals (.biz, .info, .name, and .pro) are for relatively large,
unsponsored TLDs. The other three proposals (.aero, .coop, and .museum) are for smaller "sponsored" TLDs. (Generally
speaking, an "unsponsored" TLD operates under policies established by the global Internet community directly through
the ICANN process, while a "sponsored" TLD is a specialized TLD that has a sponsoring organization representing the
narrower community that is most affected by the TLD". http://www.icann.org/tlds/ .
89   See http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=222; see also supra note (discussing DoC letter explaining that it
follows White Paper in leaving gTLD decisions to ICANN).
90   In contrast to gTLDs, adding ccTLDs appeared to be uncontroversial.  For example, the US Dept. of Commerce
authorized the creation of the  .ps. ccTLD after receiving ICANN’s recommendation that it do so, delivered in ICANN,
IANA Report on Request for Delegation of the .ps Top-Level Domain, http://www.icann.org/general/ps-report-
22mar00.htm (Mar. 22, 2000).
91   http://www.icann.org/yokohama/new-tld-topic.htm#IC .
92   Report (Part One) of Working Group C (21 March 2000), http://www.icann.org/dnso/wgc-report-21mar00.htm.
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of concept’ period.  Although one might have doubts about the validity of this technical rationale, since new
ccTLDs had been introduced without any noticeable effect on anyone, there can be no doubt that the
method ICANN chose to select the TLDs substantially reduced competition in other ways that had no
technical justification.93  There were, however, two ways in which the introduction of new gTLDs genuinely
would be new.  First, there was a huge pent-up demand for ‘good’ domain names, leading to fears of a
chaotic ‘landrush’ period in the early moments of any new registry.   Second, there was an exquisitely
heightened sensitivity to the concerns of trademark holders who believed not only that that they should be
protected from a fresh round of cybersquatting, but that trademark owners ought to be first in the queue
for new names.  The argument that the decision to introduce only a small number of new gTLDs and to
make no promises about when if ever there would be more actually increased the likelihood of
cybersquatting, since it failed to increase the supply of new names to the point where there was no
likelihood of profit from hoarding failed to persuade either the markholders’ representatives or ICANN.
 Instead, ICANN justified the small number of  gTLDs as a cautious reaction to uncertainty in light of the
Internet’s vastly increased size and commercial importance,94 a view that echoed the policy direction in the
White Paper.95
                                                
93   Among these were ICANN’s decision to require a non-refundable $50,000 “application fee,” ICANN’s requirement
that successful applicants demonstrate huge financial reserves; ICANN’s decision to have most new TLDs limited by
restrictive charters rather than being able to sell domains to all comers; and ICANN’s decision to select the names of the
new gTLDs itself rather than letting the winners do it on the basis of their market research.
94   Probably the clearest, and yet very carefully nuanced, statement of this view came after the fact from Vinton Cerf:
Of course, it cannot be stressed enough that no one knows for sure what the effects of this experiment
will be. Since there have been no new global TLDs introduced for more than a decade, the Internet is
a vastly different space than it was the last time this happened. Of course, there have been a number
of country code TLDs introduced over that period, and since some of those have recently begun to
function in a way quite analogous to a global TLD, it may be that we will be able to conclude that the
DNS can readily absorb more new global TLDs. But there has never been an introduction of as many
as seven new global TLDs simultaneously, with the possibility of a land rush that is inherent in that
fact. There has never been a highly visible introduction of multiple new TLDs in the context of an
Internet that has become a principal global medium for commerce and communication. We do not know
whether the introduction of a number of new TLDs -- especially combined with the relatively new
phenomenon of the use of ccTLDs in a fashion never intended (after all, .tv stands for Tuvalu, not
television, no matter what its marketers say) -- will create consumer confusion, or will impair the
functioning of various kinds of software that has been written to assume that .com is the most likely
domain for any address.
In short, it is not absolutely clear what effects these introductions will have on the stability of the DNS
or how to introduce new TLDs in a way that minimizes harmful side-effects, and that is precisely why
we are conducting this experiment. The results will guide our future actions.
Testimony of Vint Cerf Before U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications
and the Internet (Feb. 8 2001).
95   “At least in the short run, a prudent concern for the stability of the system suggests that expansion of gTLDs proceed
at a deliberate and controlled pace to allow for evaluation of the impact of the new gTLDs and well-reasoned evolution
of the domain space.  New top level domains could be created to enhance competition and to enable the new corporation
to evaluate the functioning, in the new environment, of the root server system and the software systems that enable
shared registration.”  White Paper, supra  note 22.
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II. Antitrust Immunity for State Action
A. The State Action Doctrine
Government agencies and those they authorize to act are immune from antitrust scrutiny.  The
principal source of such immunity is the “state action doctrine,” which strictly speaking protects only actions
by states and those they deputize, perhaps including municipal and county governments.96  However, there
are parallel immunity doctrines protecting both the United States government and foreign sovereigns.97 
The purpose behind the state action doctrine is the subject of some dispute.98  It is clear that the
Court views government action as different in some fundamental respect from private action, though whether
the source of that difference lies in the constitutional allocation of responsibilities to the states or in the
antitrust laws themselves is unsettled.99  Regardless, the Court made it clear in Parker v. Brown that a state
could immunize even naked private cartels from antitrust scrutiny if it were to require such anticompetitive
conduct as a matter of state policy.100  Similarly, Congress is free to exempt particular industries or kinds
of conduct from the antitrust laws, so long as it does so expressly.101  Indeed, because Congress is not
subject to the dictates of the Supremacy Clause, it is free to repeal the antitrust laws themselves in whole
                                                                                                                                                            
96   See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); I Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 221b.  The rules under which local
governments are exempt under the state action doctrine are complex and not relevant here.  For a discussion, see City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light, 435 U.S. 389, 412-13 (1978); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
455 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1982); I Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 223.
97   See IA Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 252 (federal sovereign immunity); ¶ 274 (foreign sovereign immunity); 28 U.S.C §§
1330, 1602-1611 (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
98   There has been a great deal of academic literature devoted to this topic.  While there are many different theories, the
literature might reasonably be divided into those who believe that government officials can be expected to act
altruistically, and therefore don’t need or deserve antitrust oversight, and those who believe government officials are
subject to capture or to the dictates of public choice theory, and therefore might be expected to act anticompetitively.
 In the former camp, see Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 1177 (1992);
Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 667 (1991); Steven Semeraro, Demystifying
Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 24 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 203 (2000).  In the latter, see Lemley & McGowan, supra  note
__; Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State Action Doctrine: Balancing Political
Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1203 (1997); John S. Wiley, Jr., A
Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1986); William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and
State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 Duke L.J. 618.
99   See Lemley & McGowan, supra  note __, at __.
100   See Parker, 317 U.S. at 341 (California raisin growers’ cartel that destroyed 70% of its crop every year in order to
“stabilize” prices was immune from antitrust scrutiny because California law authorized the cartel).
101   See, e.g., I Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 219 (exemption for insurance); ¶¶ 255-257 (labor exemption); ¶¶ 249-251
(miscellaneous other exemptions).
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or in part,102 though the Court has proved reluctant to infer such a repeal in the absence of clear evidence.103
 Importantly, though, only Congress – and not federal agencies – is entitled to waive or repeal the antitrust
laws. 
The paradigm case of antitrust immunity is where the government itself acts directly to restrain
competition, for example by passing a law setting minimum prices or forbidding new entry into a market.
 Governments are themselves immune from antitrust liability in such cases, even though the restraint on
competition may be quite egregious.  In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,104 for example,
the Court immunized a city council from antitrust liability for banning new billboards, even though there was
good evidence in the case that the mayor and other members of the council were good friends of the existing
local billboard monopolist and acted at its behest.105 
A closer question is presented when the defendant is a private actor who claims to be acting in
accordance with state policy. In both federal and state immunity cases, the question of whether a private
party shares a state’s immunity depends on two facts: whether the government has clearly articulated its
intent that the private party act anticompetitively (or at least without antitrust constraint), and whether the
state has actively supervised the subsequent conduct of the private party.106  Only if private action is both
subject to a clearly articulated government policy and actively supervised by the government will it be
entitled to antitrust immunity.
Some examples may help illumine the scope of antitrust immunity for private actors.  For example,
in California Retail, the state of California had enacted a statute that protected wine dealers by authorizing
them to engage in “resale price maintenance” – the practice of preventing discounting by requiring that
retailers sell at no less than a certain price.  Resale price maintenance is illegal per se under the federal
antitrust laws,107 and the question is whether wine dealers who engaged in such a scheme were immunized
by the state statute from federal antitrust liability.  In this case, the legislature was quite clear in articulating
its policy.108  Nonetheless, the Court rejected antitrust immunity because it found that the state had not
actively supervised the wine dealers, but had merely delegated authority over price to them:
                                                
102   See IA Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note __, at ¶242d (federal immunity “quite similar” to state immunity, but federal
immunity is always subject to the will of Congress, which can write immunity as broadly as it wishes).
103   See, e.g., National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
104   499 U.S. 365 (1991).
105   For a discussion of the facts of the case, see Lemley & McGowan, supra  note __, at 312-14.
106   See, e.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., cite; California Retail Liquor Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
107  See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1987); California Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1980); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
108   Indeed, the Court noted that “the legislative policy is forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price
maintenance.”  California Retail, 445 U.S. at 105.
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The state simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices established by private parties.  The
State neither establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules . . . The
national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.109
Thus, the Court made it clear that government cannot simply abdicate its role to set and enforce policy to
a private actor.  To similar effect is Ticor Title.110  In that case, the Federal Trade Commission alleged that
six title insurance companies had conspired to fix prices.  The companies defended on the grounds that they
belonged to “rating bureaus” – private entities organized by the companies themselves to set uniform rates
for their members – that were themselves licensed by the states and authorized to set rates, subject only to
a veto by the state regulators.  If the state did not object to the rate within thirty days, it took effect.111  The
Court held this scheme illegal as well.  It asked whether “the State has played a substantial role in
determining the specifics of the economic policy.”112  Only where “the details of the rates or prices have
been established as a product of deliberate state intervention, not simply an agreement among private
parties,” will the Court consider the state to have actively supervised the private restraint.113
The rationale of these cases is clear: “Absent such a program of supervision, there is no realistic
assurance that a private party’s anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the
private party’s individual interests.”114  To justify antitrust immunity, the government must have not only the
right and ability to overrule private decisions, but must actually exercise its power to review those
decisions.115  And despite the Court’s early deference to a price-fixing scheme in Parker v. Brown, the
clear articulation and active supervision requirements of late have proven difficult hurdles to clear.
B. Antitrust Immunity for Network Solutions
                                                
109   Id. at 105-06.
110   FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, (1992).
111   Id. at __.
112   Id. at __.
113   Id.  The same result obtains even in the absence of pricing decisions, where the state has delegated authority over
a marketplace to a private actor.  See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (peer review by Board of Medical Examiners not
immune as state action, despite state authorization, because the state did not actively supervise the Board).
114   Patrick , 486 U.S. at 100-01.
115   Id.; see also  FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 638; Shahawy v. Harrison, 875 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989); Pinhas
v. Summit Health, 894 F.2d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 1989), aff’d on other grounds 500 U.S. 322 (1991) (both finding that
deferential state review of a medical board for procedural error or arbitrary or capricious action was inadequate to clothe
the board with antitrust immunity).  Federal Law has since modified this rule.  See Health Care Quality Improvement Act,
42 U.S.C. §§101-111.
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Despite the rather strict set of requirements for antitrust immunity articulated in the previous section,
Network Solutions, Inc. fared extremely well in antitrust litigation based on its conduct during the time
before ICANN was formed.  Several reported cases have considered antitrust claims against NSI; none
have found liability.  District courts generally rejected antitrust liability on the grounds that NSI was acting
under the authority of the federal government, and so was immune from suit.  The appellate courts were
more cautious in granting such immunity, however.  In this section, we discuss those cases, as well as two
sets of related decisions, before turning in the next section to consider their implications for ICANN.
Four district courts have considered whether NSI is immune from suit because it acted at the behest
of the government in setting domain name policy.  All four courts concluded that NSI was immune from
antitrust scrutiny, in each case applying what the courts referred to as “federal instrumentality” immunity.116
 The immunity described by these cases sweeps much more broadly than the state action antitrust immunity
described in the previous section.  Indeed, in PG Media and Thomas, the district courts expressly
distinguished the state action cases, holding that federal immunity was broader and did not require proof
of anything other than authorization pursuant to a government cooperative agreement.117
Courts of appeals have been much more restrictive in their reading of NSI’s immunity, however.
 In both Thomas and Watts, the circuit courts refused to rely on immunity principles at all, instead affirming
the district court decision because of another defect in the plaintiffs’ antitrust cases.  In Thomas, the court
found the question of NSI’s immunity “not clearly settled.”118  The court held that the United States
government was clearly immune from suit under the antitrust laws.119  By contrast, the court noted that
It is not obvious to us . . . that a private contractor automatically shares the federal agency’s
immunity simply because the contractor’s allegedly anti-competitive conduct occurred . . . pursuant
to a government contract.  A contractor might be free to perform the contract in any number of
ways, only one of which is anticompetitive.120
                                                
116   See, e.g., Beverly v. Network Solutions, Inc., 1998 WL 320829, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 1998) (NSI immune because
it is a private party “acting in compliance with a clearly articulated government program”; no mention of active
supervision requirement); Watts v. Network Solutions, Inc., 1999 WL 778589, at *3 (S.D. Ind. May 7, 1999), aff’d on other
grounds 202 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpublished); Thomas v. Network Solutions, 2 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d on
other grounds, 176 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1999); PGMedia v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d
sub nom. Name.space, Inc., v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000).  Other cases are pending.  See, e.g.,
Chrysalis Vineyards v. U.S. Department of Commerce, No. 00-1330-A (E.D. Va. filed Sept. 7, 2000).
117   See Thomas, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
118   176 F.3d at 508.
119   Id. (citing United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941) (U.S. government not a “person” who can be sued under
the Sherman Act); Sea-Land Service v. Alaska Railroad, 659 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (wholly owned and operated
government corporation was immune from suit).
120   Id. at 508-09 (citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973)).  In Otter Tail, the Court seemed to
reject the idea that government contracts could confer antitrust immunity, noting that “government contracting officers
do not have the power to grant immunity from the Sherman Act.”  Id. at 378-79.  But the court went on to suggest that
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The court did not decide the issue, choosing instead to address the deficiencies it perceived in the merits
of the plaintiff’s antitrust claim.121  The Seventh Circuit did the same thing in the Watts case.  It noted that
NSI’s immunity was not automatic, as the district court had held, citing Thomas.122  Like Thomas, the court
chose to affirm on another antitrust ground (in that case standing) “rather than decide the complex issue of
whether NSI enjoys antitrust immunity.”123  Because the Watts decision is unpublished, however, its
endorsement of the D.C. Circuit approach is of no precedential value.
The most detailed treatment of the issue is the Second Circuit’s opinion in Name.space.124  In that
case, the plaintiff had challenged NSI’s refusal to issue new gTLDs.  NSI had initially decided to issue new
TLDs, but after consulting with the National Science Foundation, the NSF directed it not to do so.  NSI
followed this directive and refused to issue new TLDs, whereupon the plaintiff sued it for violating the
antitrust laws.  The district court held that NSI was entirely immune from antitrust scrutiny under the federal
instrumentality doctrine.125
On appeal, the Second Circuit refused to apply the federal instrumentality doctrine, reasoning that
“reliance on such a broad rule of immunity might improperly insulate NSI and other private entities that are
or will be involved in administering the DNS from liability for future anticompetitive conduct.”126  Rather,
the court applied an immunity doctrine based largely on the state action doctrine.  It had little trouble finding
immunity in the case before it, however, because “the conduct being challenged by Name.Space in this
appeal was compelled by the explicit terms of NSI’s agreement with a government agency and by the
government policies.”127  To require NSI to act, yet permit it to be sued for doing what the government
required it to do, would be unfair.128
These cases suggest that NSI’s antitrust immunity for conduct related to the DNS is far from clearly
settled.  In fact, it is unlikely that NSI will receive absolute immunity.  Rather, immunity will be determined
on the basis of traditional principles drawn from the state action cases: did the government clearly articulate
                                                                                                                                                            
some contracting parties may in fact be immune by virtue of their relationship to the government, leaving the Court’s
holding on this point less than clear. 
121   176 F.3d at 509 (holding that Thomas had not made out the elements of an essential facilities claim).
122   202 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 1999).
123   Id.
124   202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000).
125   PGMedia v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
126   202 F.3d at 581.
127   Id. at 582.
128   Id. at 583 (quoting Alpha Lyracom Space Comm. v. Communications Satellite Corp., 946 F.2d 168, 174 (2d Cir. 1991)
“Congress could not have intended to require a private entity to act subject to federal governmental directives and, at
the same time, have intended that it proceed at its own antitrust peril in carrying out that official role.”).
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a policy that requires interference with competition, and did the government actively supervise private
decision-making in accordance with that policy.
Two other sets of cases deserve brief mention here.  First, two domain name antitrust decisions
have rejected the plaintiffs’ claims for failure to define a proper economic market.129  While these cases are
not directly relevant to antitrust immunity, they do remind us of the important point that immunity is not all
there is to antitrust law.  Even if NSI is not immune from antitrust scrutiny, an antitrust plaintiff will have to
prove all the elements of a section 2 claim in order to prevail.  We discuss potential antitrust claims in more
detail in Part III.
Second, two courts have considered whether NSI is a state actor in a different context: whether
it must conform its conduct to the Constitution, and in particular to the First Amendment.  In both cases,
the court concluded that NSI was not a state actor for First Amendment purposes.130  The courts
emphasized the facts that registering domain names is not a traditional governmental function,131 that the
government did not impose restrictive regulatory oversight on NSI, and that the “nexus” between the
government and NSI was not sufficiently close to find that the two were in a symbiotic relationship.132  The
standards for state action in the First Amendment context are different than in the antitrust context,133 and
the courts’ conclusions are certainly contestable on their merits.134  Still, it is interesting that in the
constitutional context, courts have minimized the extent to which NSI acts at the government’s behest.  The
facts they cite may turn out to be quite relevant to the antitrust immunity inquiry as well.
C. Antitrust Immunity for ICANN?
Given this legal background, and what we learned about ICANN’s relationship to the government
in Part I, what are ICANN’s prospects for antitrust immunity?  As an initial matter, it seems safe to say that
ICANN will not be able to rely on an absolute form of federal instrumentality immunity.  Congress has not
                                                
129   Weber v. National Football League, 112 F. Supp. 2d 667 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (no relevant economic market for subset
of domain names that constitute NFL trademarks); Smith v. Network Solutions, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (N.D. Ala. 2001)
(no relevant economic market for expired domain names).
130   National A-1 Advertising, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.N.H. 2000); Island Online v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
131   The courts disagreed on this point.  Compare National, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (registering domain names is a
traditional governmental function) with Island Online, 119 F. Supp. 2d at __ (holding the opposite).  The D.C. Circuit
weighed in on the latter side in Thomas, 176 F.3d at 511.
132   Id.
133   For a discussion of the First Amendment standards, see, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 503 (1985); Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1296 (1982).
134   See Froomkin, supra  note 5, at 113-25 (arguing that ICANN is a state actor for constitutional purposes); see generally
Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Doctrine: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms
to Private Regulation, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1263 (2000).
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created an express exception to the antitrust laws for ICANN.  Indeed, it has not spoken at all on the
subject.  So if ICANN is to be immune from antitrust suit, it must be because of its contracts with the
Department of Commerce.  But appellate courts so far have not endorsed the theory that any government
contractor is entitled to absolute immunity.  Rather, the most likely approach will be one akin to the state
action doctrine: a case-by-case analysis of whether ICANN’s actions were pursuant to a clearly articulated
governmental policy to displace competition and were actively supervised by the government.
While the issue is not free from doubt, we are skeptical that all of ICANN’s conduct can meet that
test. ICANN does have a case on the clearly articulated government policy prong, but the facts currently
in the public record suggest that it would have a very hard time showing the necessary degree of active
government supervision and involvement in its implementation of that policy.  Of course, it is always possible
that ICANN would be able to demonstrate that the government has had a far greater behind-the-scenes
involvement in ICANN’s decisions than either DoC or ICANN has admitted; at present, however, we take
the parties at their word that since its formation DoC has given ICANN very great independence.
The White Paper can be used to argue both sides of the “clearly articulated government policy”
test.  On the one hand, the White Paper itself considered and rejected the idea that ‘NewCo,’ as it then
was, should be given antitrust immunity.  Indeed, in the White Paper the government argued that
“[a]pplicable antitrust law will provide accountability to and protection for the international Internet
community. Legal challenges and lawsuits can be expected within the normal course of business for any
enterprise and the new corporation should anticipate this reality.”135  This seems if anything a fairly clearly
articulated policy that there not be antitrust immunity.136 
On the other hand, the White Paper also contained a number of policy directions for NewCo,
instructions that ICANN has on the whole faithfully followed.  For example, in the White Paper the
Department of Commerce clearly articulated a view that the DNS needed an anti-cybersquatting policy,
and stated that the policy, whatever it was, should be put into place by a new non-profit corporation that
took over administration of the DNS.  That said, the White Paper had relatively little to say about the
details.137  Whether this general, but emphatic, statement in a legally non-binding ‘policy statement’, and the
                                                
135   White Paper, supra  note 22.
136   But see Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (holding that Congressional statement that
otherwise public corporation was private did not make it private for First Amendment purposes).
137    The White Paper stated:
       “[T]he U.S. Government recommends that the new corporation adopt policies whereby:
              1) Domain registrants pay registration fees at the time of registration or renewal and agree to submit infringing
domain names to     the authority of a court of law in the jurisdiction in which the registry, registry database, registrar,
or the "A" root servers are located.
              2) Domain name registrants would agree, at the time of registration or renewal, that in cases involving cyberpiracy
or cybersquatting (as opposed to conflicts between legitimate competing rights holders), they would submit to and be
bound by alternative dispute resolution systems identified by the new corporation for the purpose of resolving those
conflicts. Registries and Registrars should be required to abide by decisions of the ADR system.
             3) Domain name registrants would agree, at the time of registration or renewal, to abide by processes adopted by
the new corporation that exclude, either pro-actively or retroactively, certain famous trademarks from being used as
domain names (in one or more TLDs) except by the designated trademark holder.
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Department’s subsequent praise for the UDRP, constitutes a sufficiently clear federal policy that there
should be a UDRP certainly could be debated.  Any such debate would be enriched by arguments that even
if DoC had a policy favoring some kind of uniform dispute policy, it lacked the statutory authority to make
such a policy.  The ultra vires argument rests on the assertion that DoC has no specific statutory authority
or obligation to control the DNS or the alpha root,138 and the observation that the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act (ADRA) generally prohibits an agency from requiring arbitration to settle “the resolution of
an issue in controversy that relates to an administrative program.”139  The problem here for ICANN is that
if DoC directly required the UDRP it probably140 violated ADRA.  If it didn’t directly require the UDRP,
it’s hard to argue that the federal policy was sufficiently explicit to meet the ‘clear articulation’ and ‘active
supervision’ tests.  Similarly, it is evident that DoC intended for one of ICANN’s tasks to be the selection
of new gTLDs, but other than defining general principles designed to guide ICANN, DoC did not instruct
it as to how to go about picking TLDs or registries.
Even if ICANN were able to prevail on the “clearly articulated” prong, on the facts publicly
available its chances of prevailing on the “active supervision” requirement look slim.  Although DoC may
have set out specific tasks for ICANN to achieve such as the prevention of cyberpiracy, both ICANN and
DoC have asserted that ICANN acts independently of US Government control.   Indeed, ICANN seems
to be a paradigmatic case of a contractor left “free to perform the contract in any number of ways”.141 
There are no defined procedures by which DOC reviews ICANN’s work,142 and even in the case of
additions to the root, where DoC retains final authority to alter or countermand ICANN’s decisions,143
                                                                                                                                                            
             4) Nothing in the domain name registration agreement or in the operation of the new corporation should limit the
rights that can be asserted by a domain name registrant or trademark owner under national laws.”
White Paper, supra  note 22.
       ICANN’s ultimate plan substantially complied with 1 and 2, but not 3.  It attempted to comply with 4, although how
successful it was is hotly debated.  See Froomkin, supra  note 87.
138   Such at least was the GAO’s view   See GAO Report, supra  note 48.
139   Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-83 (1994).  An "issue in controversy" is defined as
"an issue which is material to a decision concerning an administrative program of an agency, and with which there is
disagreement" either "between an agency and persons who would be substantially affected by the decision" or "between
persons who would be substantially affected by the decision." Id. §§ 571(8)(A)-(B).  See Froomkin, supra  note 5, at 135-
36.
140   There being no relevant caselaw, it remains possible for DoC to argue that by using a contractor to execute its policy
it somehow took itself out of ADRA’s reach.
141   One of us has argued that ICANN is in fact too free of government control, and that DoC’s grant of so much
discretion to ICANN amounts to a violation of the non-delegation doctrine in Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
 See Froomkin, supra  note 5.
142    See Froomkin, supra  note 5, at 107-13; Dinwoodie & Helfer, supra  note 5 (arguing that ICANN is not subject to
effective scrutiny).
143    See supra  note 53.
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DoC has stated that it does not intend to exercise any substantive review.144  DoC has intervened in
ICANN policy making on rare occasions, but these primarily concerned ICANN’s relationship with
NSI/VeriSign, another government contractor.  In 1999, DoC was intensively involved in brokering a deal
between ICANN and NSI, in which NSI agreed to recognize ICANN’s authority over it in exchange for
an extension of its monopoly on the .com, .net and .org registries and certain limits on ICANN’s freedom
to regulate it.145  Another intensive intervention came when several influential legislators objected to
ICANN’s proposed revisions to the ICANN-NSI/VeriSign contract, a change that required Commerce
Department approval under the earlier set of agreements.146  DoC and the US Justice Department stepped
in and altered the agreement to reflect antitrust concerns arising from VeriSign’s retention of ownership in
both the dominant registries and the dominant registrar.147 
In contrast, other than the statements in the White Paper, there is little in the public record to
suggest that DoC instructed ICANN as either to the content of the UDRP or its procedural rules, or the
ways in which ICANN should manage the selection of arbitration service providers.  The main signs of
continuing DoC involvement have been: (1) in July, 1999, a DoC official told a House Subcommittee that
DoC had been consulting with ICANN before ICANN’s major decisions, such as ICANN's proposal to
charge a fee of $1 per domain name;148 (2) in the June, 2000, MoU, DoC promised to devote more than
a quarter of a million dollars in staff time and expenses to monitoring and helping ICANN, which DoC
estimated would equal half-time dedication of four or five full-time employees;149 and, in July, 2000,
ICANN’s Board  passed  resolution of thanks to outgoing NTIA official Becky Burr mentioning her
“enormous contributions.”150  Other than these, there is little sign that the government has had a role in
                                                
144    See supra note 54.
145    See Froomkin, supra , note 5, at 89-91.
146  See House Democrats Up the Ante on ICANN/VeriSign Deal, http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=154; Letter,
http://www.house.gov/commerce_democrats/press/107ltr53.htm; US House Leaders Warn on VeriSign Deal ,
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=72.
147 See SPIN CYCLE: Commerce Release on Final ICANN/VeriSign Domain Name,
http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=159 (quoting DoC press release).
148   Letter from Andrew J. Pincus, DoC General Counsel, to Rep. Tom Bliley, Chairman, United States House Committee
on  Commerce (July 8, 1999), Information Administration,  http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/blileyrsp.htm.
149    Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 41, at 7.
150    “Along with her colleagues at the Department of Commerce, she played an essential facilitating role in not only the
creation of ICANN, but also in its creation of contractual relationships with many of the important elements of the Internet
community which have been and will be instrumental in its continued viability as an effective global, private sector,
consensus creation body.”
       “It would not be an overstatement to conclude that, without the enormous contributions of Becky Burr, ICANN
would not be here today, or at a minimum would not have made the very significant progress that is reflected at this
meeting. She could not have done it alone, but we could not have done what we have done without her tireless devotion
to the objective of a viable and effective ICANN.”
Preliminary Report: Meeting of the ICANN Board in Yokohama, Res. 00.59-00.62, at http://icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-
16jul00.htm (July 16, 2000) at 12-13.
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supervising the (increasingly criticized151) administration of the UDRP since its adoption, other than general
cheerleading,152 although one presumes those DoC employees were doing something. 
Similarly, there is nothing in the public record to suggest that DoC took an active role in ICANN’s
selection of new gTLDs.  DoC’s role appears to have been limited to giving ICANN authority to select new
gTLDS in its initial contracts, and in its rubber-stamp approval of ICANN’s choices, with little or nothing
in between.  The high water mark of DoC’s intervention appears to have been a recent letter from Secretary
of Commerce Evans to ICANN -- long after the first round selection process was over -- to urge it to
approve the next round of domains more quickly.153  The facts that Secretary Evans felt a need to write to
ICANN, rather than just instruct it, and that the letter appears to have had no effect whatsoever, both argue
strongly that ICANN’s selection of new gTLDs is not subject to close supervision by DoC.
ICANN’s resistance to alternate roots follows the same pattern.  Again, the policy arguably has
its origins in the White Paper, which stated that “The introduction of a new management system should not
disrupt current operations or create competing root Systems.”154  Similar language did not, however, get
included in the ICANN-DoC MoU.155  In particular, there is no evidence that ICANN’s refusal to even
consider applications from firms that enabled alternate roots was required by the government.156 This is
particularly important because ICANN’s revenue base depends on its being in charge of the only root of
                                                                                                                                                            
151    See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 87; Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/geistudrp.pdf (August 2001); Milton Mueller, Rough
Justice: A statistical assessment of ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, http://dcc.syr.edu/roughjustice.htm;
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
151 (2000).
152    An NTIA report last year praised the UDRP as “an efficient, inexpensive procedure for the resolution of disputes.”
 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration Annual Report 2000,
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/annualrpt/2001/2000annrpt.htm.
153    See David McGuire, Newsbytes, Commerce Department Urges ICANN To Add More New Domains, May 25, 2001,
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/166139.html.
154    White Paper, supra  note 22, at 31,743.
155    Compare the White Paper with the MOU.
        “The U.S. Government should end its role in the Internet number and name address system in a manner that ensures
the stability of the Internet. The introduction of a new management system should not disrupt current operations or
create competing root systems. During the transition and thereafter, the stability of the Internet should be the first priority
of any DNS management system. Security and reliability of the DNS are important aspects of stability, and as a new DNS
management system is introduced, a comprehensive security strategy should be developed.”
White Paper, supra  note 22, at 31,743.
        “This Agreement promotes the stability of the Internet and allows the Parties to plan for a deliberate move from the
existing structure to a private-sector structure without disruption to the functioning of the DNS. The Agreement calls
for the design, development, and testing of a new management system that will not harm current functional operations.”
MOU, supra  note 41, at § C.1
156   For a discussion of alternate roots and their competitive implications, see infra  __.
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any importance. ICANN thus stands to gain from keeping its monopoly, and the government effectively
delegated market control to a private party with an interest in the outcome.  While the government can do
this, the delegee is entitled to antitrust immunity only if the government actively supervises its conduct. 
Where private conduct directly restricts competition, that supervision must include direct control over the
price or output setting, not merely a generalized delegation.157  This does not appear to be the case with
ICANN. 
It is true that NSI has so far avoided antitrust liability for its actions in running the DNS during a
prior era.  But ICANN may not fare so well.  Most of the cases against NSI were in fact ultimately resolved
on the antitrust merits, not on grounds of antitrust immunity.158  The one case ultimately finding immunity
relied on the fact that NSI was specifically directed to engage in the challenged practice by the government.
 ICANN may be able to point to similar government mandates in a few cases, but surely cannot justify all
its policies in this way.  As one court put it, “the government’s role in the Internet is deliberately waning.
 By design, the private sector is assuming an ever-increasing role in determining relevant policies and
protocols, and domain name registration is now a competitive endeavor . . . .”159  ICANN was intended
to get the U.S. government out of the business of running the DNS.  While the government certainly hasn’t
succeeded completely in disentangling itself from the domain name system, it gives less policy direction and
less direct oversight to ICANN than it did to NSI in the mid-1990s.  With that increased authority comes
responsibility under the antitrust laws.  ICANN’s actions may or may not violate the antitrust laws; we turn
to that subject in the next Part.  But it is not entitled to ignore those laws altogether.160
III. Is ICANN Violating the Antitrust Laws?
Assuming that ICANN is not immune from antitrust liability,161 the next step is to consider the merits
                                                
157   See, e.g., A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris, __ F.3d __, 2001-1 Trade Cases ¶ 73,310 (3d Cir. 2001) (state
action doctrine doesn’t provide immunity from allegation that state government-tobacco settlement facilitates a cartel;
while the government clearly articulated its policy of restricting production of cigarettes, the states “lack oversight or
authority over the tobacco manufacturers’ price and production levels.  These decisions are left entirely to the state
actors.”  This constituted inadequate state supervision).
158   See supra  notes __-__ and accompanying text.
159   National A-1 Advertising, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 166.  See also  Zittrain, supra note 7, at 1092 (describing ICANN as taking
a “middle path” between public and private status).
160   The decreasing role of the government also makes it likely that VeriSign, NSI’s successor company, will no longer
enjoy immunity for its conduct.  Indeed, the May 2001 revision of the contract between ICANN and VeriSign makes it
clear that the Commerce Department does not intend to immunize VeriSign from antitrust scrutiny.  See, e.g., Department
of Commerce Approves ICANN Registry Agreements with VeriSign, Inc., 6 Elec. Comm. & L. Rpt. 567 (2001).
161   As we noted in part II, there is some question as to ICANN’s immunity.  But for the remainder of this part and the
next, we will assume that ICANN is not categorically immune from antitrust liability.
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of antitrust claims likely to be brought against it.162  In this part, we consider the merits of three likely
antitrust challenges: a claim that the DNS and/or the TLDs are an essential facility to which ICANN must
open access on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; a claim that ICANN’s refusal to accredit registrars
who are affiliated with alternative or competitive roots is illegal; and a claim that ICANN’s insistence on
registrars’ adherence to uniform mandatory dispute resolution policies is illegal.
A. Principles of Antitrust Law
Antitrust law treats unilateral conduct under the law of monopolization.  The governing statute is
section 2 of the Sherman Act, which sweeps broadly to condemn "every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize," a relevant market.163  The concept of monopolization embodies two crucial
principles.  First, to be liable under section 2 of the Sherman Act, a defendant must be a monopolist, or at
least be likely to become a monopolist.  Antitrust law does not generally scrutinize the unilateral conduct
of individuals or companies; those who hold a monopoly position in a market are an exception to this
general rule.  Second, the mere possession or even acquisition of a monopoly alone is not illegal.164  Rather,
the offense of monopolization requires not just a monopoly, but some sort of anticompetitive conduct
designed to acquire or maintain that monopoly.
Thus, in United States v. Grinnell Corp.,165 the Court defined monopolization under section 2 as
follows:
(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.166
These limitations are designed to balance two competing policy interests.  On the one hand, the
antitrust law reflects an economic judgment that competition is desirable and monopolies are undesirable.
 Competition is good for a variety of reasons.  Basic economics teaches that firms in competition will
produce more and price lower than monopolists.  Monopolists not only take money away from consumers
by raising prices, but they impose a "deadweight loss" on society by reducing their output below the level
                                                
162   While we are aware of no reported antitrust decisions involving ICANN to date, the proliferation of claims against
NSI – including some still being filed after ICANN took over, see Chrysalis Vineyards v. U.S. Department of Commerce,
No. 00-1330-A (E.D. Va. filed Sept. 7, 2000) – suggest that such cases are coming.
163   15 U.S.C. §2.
164   See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (acquisition of monopoly power by
"superior skill, superior products, natural advantages, economic or technological efficiency," and other legal means is
not illegal).
165   384 U.S. 563 (1966).
166   Id. at 570-71.
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which consumers would be willing to purchase at a competitive price.  As a result, some transactions that
would make economic sense (because consumers value the product at more than it would cost to produce
it) do not occur.167  Monopoly has other problems as well.  It inherently reduces consumer choice, and
monopolists have fewer incentives to innovate than do competitive firms. 
At the same time, the law cannot merely forbid all monopolies.  Some monopolies result from
natural economic conditions that permit only one firm to operate efficiently in a given market.  Such “natural
monopolies” include local distribution of electric power or telephone service.  Other monopolies result from
vigorous competition on the merits -- precisely the sort of behavior the antitrust law is designed to
encourage.  Still other monopolies result from a firm's innovation, either because the innovation makes the
firm more efficient or because legally granted intellectual property rights give the firm a certain measure of
control over a market.168  If the law forbade every monopoly, it would discourage innovation and
competition by causing large companies to worry too much about questionable behavior.169  The section
2 cases attempt to strike a balance by prohibiting only monopolies acquired or maintained by
anticompetitive means.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids agreements in restraint of trade.  Courts have identified two
basic types of agreements that may be in restraint of trade -- agreements among competitors (called
"horizontal restraints") and agreements between buyers and sellers (called "vertical restraints").170  Vertical
restraints are generally less threatening to competition than horizontal restraints.  With the exception of
vertical price fixing, they are generally judged under the "rule of reason."  Under the rule of reason, courts
balance the anticompetitive harms of a restraint against its procompetitive benefits.  Only those restraints
which produce harms significantly in excess of benefits to competition are deemed unreasonable.
Horizontal restraints are more troubling because they may allow the participants to create a cartel,
which can then behave anticompetitively, much as a monopolist would.  At first, most agreements between
competitors were deemed illegal "per se," without any necessity for a weighing of harms and benefits to
competition.  Today, the Supreme Court has retreated from that position, recognizing that certain
agreements among competitors may be efficient and procompetitive.  Most horizontal restraints are now
judged under the rule of reason.  Only certain forms of "naked" agreements to fix prices or divide territories
remain illegal per se.  Nonetheless, it is fair to say that antitrust treats agreements among competitors more
harshly than is unilateral conduct.
                                                
167   For a detailed discussion of the economic intuition here, see 2A Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶ 402-415.
168   We do not mean to suggest that intellectual property rights normally confer market power; far from it.  Normally they
do not.  See I Herbert Hovenkamp et al, IP and Antitrust § 4.2 (forthcoming October 2001).  But intellectual property
rights do sometimes provide competitive advantages to their owners.  When they do, it would undermine the intellectual
property laws to make it illegal to take advantage of those rights.
169   This is particularly true since, as we shall see, the remedies for an antitrust violation can include treble damages,
structural relief breaking up a company, and even criminal penalties.
170  Actually, the term "vertical restraints" refers to a whole class of transactions between companies in a vertical
relationship in the chain of distribution, including dealers, franchisors, distributors, resellers, etc.
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While the antitrust laws apply to acts “in commerce,” it is clear that ICANN’s non-profit status will
not protect it.  Antitrust law reaches non-profit concerns so long as they engage in activities that affect
commerce;171 ICANN clearly does so.  Thus, we turn in the following sections to the substantive antitrust
issues that are likely to be raised by ICANN’s conduct to date.
B. DNS as an Essential Facility
One sort of monopolization case departs from the general rules articulated above because it does
not involve “conduct” at all in the affirmative sense.  Courts sometimes hold that a monopolist has a duty
to deal with competitors, or at least to continue a relationship once it has begun.172  Under this doctrine, the
monopoly owner of an “essential facility” for competition may be forced to give access to that facility to
competitors on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.173  The essential facilities doctrine is unique in that
a monopolist’s status (as the owner of the facility and a competitor in the market that relies on the facility)
rather than any affirmative conduct determines liability.174
The essential facilities doctrine grew out of a number of cases in which one company (or a group
of them) had exclusive control over some facility and used that control to gain an advantage over
competitors in an adjacent or downstream market.  Most of the canonical cases have this basic structure.
 Thus, in Terminal Railroad, a group of railroads jointly owned a key bridge over the Mississippi River
and accompanying rail yard, and refused to give competing railroads use of the facilities.175  In Otter Tail,
the public utility that owned all the transmission lines into a municipality refused to allow the municipality to
“wheel” power over those lines from outside plants, because the utility itself wanted to provide power to
the municipality.176  And in MCI v. AT&T, the pre-breakup Bell System refused to permit MCI to connect
its long distance calls to the Bell System’s local phone exchanges.177  In each of these cases, the defendant
owned a facility that could not plausibly be duplicated, and also participated in a competitive downstream
                                                
171   See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984); _ Areeda &
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ __; Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust and the Not-For-Profit Sector (NBER
working paper 8126).
172   On the latter concept, see Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (finding a refusal
to continue dealing by a monopolist illegal in the absence of a legitimate business justification). 
173   For a detailed discussion of the essential facilities doctrine, see 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶ 770-774
(2d ed.).
174   The monopolist in an essential facilities case may be thought to have “acted” in some sense, by refusing to deal or
to continue dealing with a competitor.  But generally speaking a unilateral refusal to deal is not the sort of anticompetitive
conduct that the antitrust law is concerned with.
175   United States v. Terminal R.R. Assn., 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
176   Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
177   MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
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market that required access to the facility.  By denying access to the facility, the defendant either eliminated
its downstream competitors or imposed significant costs on them.178
In MCI, the court set out a four-part test for an essential facilities claim:
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability practically or
reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor;
and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.179
If such a claim is made out, the defendant will be obligated to provide access to the facility on reasonable
and nondiscriminatory terms.
Under this test, the defendant must be a monopolist, and the facility must be “essential” in the sense
that the competitor needs access to it in order to compete.  An essential facility will therefore normally be
an input into the competitive market – some component that must be used in providing the competitive
product or service.  The need must be substantial, however – inconvenience or cost increase resulting from
unavailability should not suffice.180  The court’s test also offers a defense of legitimate business justification,
by permitting the defendant to show that it wasn’t feasible to provide access to the facility.  The “reasonable
and nondiscriminatory terms” language also limits the defendant’s obligation in circumstances where
particular plaintiffs cannot afford to pay, aren’t willing to pay a reasonable price, or the like.181
While the MCI court doesn’t discuss it directly, it seems important to add that withholding an
essential facility is illegal only if it has the effect of foreclosing competition in the downstream market, and
therefore of helping the defendant to acquire or maintain a monopoly in that market.  Thus, the owner of
the facility in question must be vertically integrated into the market in which competition is being foreclosed.
 Otter Tail and MCI both had such a characteristic.182  In the absence of such a market effect, condemning
a truly unilateral refusal to deal could open the door to all sorts of claims in which competition is not really
at stake.
                                                
178   A very different sort of essential facility-type claim is envisioned by those few cases that impose a duty to continue
dealing.  For example, in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), the Court held that a
ski company that owned 3 of the 4 mountains in a local area was obligated to continue offering a multi-area skiing pass
with its sole competitor in that local area.  While the Court did not discuss the case in essential facilities terms, there is
no other antitrust concept that readily fits these circumstances.  By avoiding the use of essential facilities language,
however, the Court short-circuited inquiry into how important the multi-area pass actually was to competition.
179   MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132-33.
180   See Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536, 544-46 (9th Cir. 1991) (airline computer reservation system was
not an essential facility because airlines could compete without it, albeit at higher cost).
181   Whether this defense would extend to other sorts of business justifications for refusing to deal is not clear.
182   It is not clear that Terminal Railroad fits easily in this framework, but that case may be complicated by its reliance
on a conspiracy between different railroads in violation of section 1.
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The essential facilities doctrine has come in for serious criticism.  Many prominent antitrust scholars
have argued that the doctrine should be abolished outright.183  Others who favor the continued existence
of the doctrine nonetheless concede that it is properly applied only in rare cases.184 
Is the legacy-root server an essential facility to which ICANN must provide access?  One court
addressed this issue in a suit against NSI, though its decision leaves a number of issues unresolved.  In
Thomas v. Network Solutions,185 the plaintiffs were entities who had registered domain names through
NSI.  The D.C. Circuit held against them on the essential facilities claim, not because access to the root
server wasn’t essential (a question it did not decide), but because the plaintiffs in that case did not compete
with NSI in a downstream market and so could not demonstrate a required element of an essential facilities
claim.186
A more likely essential facilities claim is one brought by a competitor.  Under early pre-ICANN
market structure, such a claim was fairly easy to envision.  The government controlled the root zone file that
was relied on by the alpha root server and all downstream copies of it.  NSI controlled both the
authoritative .com registry and was the exclusive registrar for .com and the other open gTLDs.  Entry in the
root zone file allowed firms to be registries; NSI’s entry for .com meant that an entry in its database was
necessary to permit others to access your Web site by typing an alphanumeric URL; if your domain name
was not in the registry whose address was found on the master list, no one relying on DNS servers in the
legacy root could find you by entering that domain name.187  If a plaintiff sought to compete as a registrar
by taking registrations for .com, it would be stymied by NSI’s refusal to enter such competing registrations
in the only authoritative registry for .com listed in the root zone file.  Thus, NSI would have denied access
to a facility it controlled (the .com registry), essential to competition, to which it could feasibly have provided
access, with the effect of perpetuating its dominance in a separate product market – the market for
registration services. 
Over time, NSI was forced to allow other registrars to sell registrations.  Even then, there were
                                                
183   See, e.g., Philip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 Antitrust L.J. 841 (1989);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy at §7.7 (2d ed. 1999) (“The so-called essential facility doctrine is one of
the most troublesome, incoherent and unmanageable of bases for Sherman § 2 liability.  The antitrust world would almost
certainly be a better place if it were jettisoned . . . “); David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age:
Computer Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 Hastings Comm/Ent. L.J. 771 (1996).
184   See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 1041, 1085-86 (1996).
185   176 F.3d 500, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
186   Id.  Cf. America Online v. Greatdeals.net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 862 (E.D. Va. 1999) (complaint properly alleged that email
access to AOL subscribers was an essential facility, but was nonetheless dismissed because the plaintiff and defendant
did not compete).
187   They could, however, reach your web site with a browser by typing in the IP number.  E-mail works slightly
differently, and there are some e-mail programs that simply cannot send e-mail to an address at an IP number, but these
are relatively rare.  Although it is not part of the minimum specifications, most e-mail programs can send mail to an
address of the form user@[129.171.97.1].
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allegations that NSI’s registry gave various sorts of preferential access to its registrar, and that the NSI
registry’s price (set in a contract with the US Government) exceeded fair market value. These problems
stemmed from NSI’s vertical integration.  NSI controlled the .com registry, and also competed with other
registrars in the market for registration services. It thus had the classic structure for an essential facilities
claim.  The obvious solution was to separate control of the registry from control of the registrar.  Indeed,
getting an agreement that NSI would divest itself of either the registrar or the registry by May 10, 2001 was
supposed to be one of DoC and ICANN’s major achievements, although when the time came and NSI
threatened to divest itself of the registrar, and then affiliate with another one, ICANN blinked.  It instead
accepted VeriSign/NSI’s proposal to divest itself of .org and .net within a few years while keeping .com.
 The government then further modified the agreement to require auditing of the ‘firewall’ between the
registry and the registrar and a few other antitrust-inspired changes.188
ICANN’s control of access to the root raises different issues from NSI’s because ICANN acts
as neither a registrar or a registry.189  ICANN’s has power over registries and (through them) registrars;
its control is greatest over those seeking ICANN’s approval to enter the legacy root.  ICANN has at least
one direct financial incentive to limit the number of gTLDs to the root.  So long as there is a shortage of
gTLDs, firms will pay ICANN substantial sums simply to be allowed to apply for consideration.  Indeed,
last year ICANN was able to require applicants to pay it a non-refundable $50,000 fee, “intended to cover
ICANNs costs of receiving and evaluating the application, including  performing technical, financial,
business, and legal analyses, as well as ICANNs investigation of all circumstances  surrounding the
applications and follow-up items.”190  Forty-seven applicants purchased what amounted to expensive lottery
tickets, but ICANN selected only seven to receive a TLD.  The greater the number selected, the less
ICANN would have the leverage to require a similar payment from the next round of applicants.
Other than the premium it can demand from would-be entrants, however, it is debatable whether
ICANN itself, as opposed to incumbent registries, has a financial incentive to limit the number of new
entrants to the root.  ICANN annually sets its financial needs, and assesses income from registries and
registrars, who pay according to various formulas that in part reflect their market shares.  All other things
being equal,191 ICANN may have a financial incentive to increase the number of registrants, since that
spreads the costs and increases the amounts it can levy without occasioning protest, which should argue for
more TLDs since these should tend to increase total registrations.  To the extent that new TLDs just shift
                                                
188     See supra  text at notes --.
189    Actually, ICANN has hosted the registries for new gTLDs as they come on stream.  The reasons for this are not clear.
 Some have suggested it’s a subsidy to the registries; others that ICANN wants an excuse to buy computers, or to learn
how to run a registry in case it ever needs to rescue a failing one.   ICANN’s announcement was short on details, but
describes it as a temporary measure.
190    See ICANN, New TLD Application Process Overview, http://www.icann.org/tlds/application-process-03aug00.htm
(Aug. 3, 2000) (noting “The application fee is non-refundable and ICANN's only obligation upon accepting the
application and fee is to consider the application.”).
191    One way in which they are not equal is the administrative cost of dunning large numbers of registrars.  ICANN has
been moving to a funding strategy that concentrates on registries since there are fewer of them.
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a constant number of registrations around registries, ICANN should be neutral, unless the very small
number of registries allows them to charge a premium price, and lets ICANN demand part of that rent for
itself.   Only if new TLDs were to so significantly increase supply in the relevant market that it substantially
depressed the prices charged by registries or registrars might ICANN’s income stream be affected.192 
Because ICANN does not compete directly in either the registry or registrar markets, it does not conform
to the classical structure of an essential facilities case.
ICANN’s relationship with the alternate root operators presents a more complex issue in market
definition and definition of market participants.  On the one hand, the alternate root operators as a group
are ICANN’s true competitors in that they create opportunities (currently, tiny ones) for new TLDs and
new registries.  Plus, entrants in their roots do not pay ICANN’s levies, giving ICANN a financial motive
to fear growth in their market penetration -- a growth that network effects suggest would be likely to take
off once it reached some distant critical mass.193  On the other hand, it is a little difficult to identify any
individual person or firm as ICANN’s competitor.  The alternate root operators work in a far more
decentralized fashion than ICANN.  There is no central policymaking body for the alternate roots as a
group, and most of the major groups have only loose coordination bodies seeking to head off name
collisions.  So while the alternate root based registries as a group are ICANN’s competition, individually
the operators are more like competition for ICANN-approved registries than for ICANN itself. 
The most important competitive relationship between ICANN and the alternate root operators
arises from the competition for the name space.   Traditionally, alternate root operators have worked with
considerable  (but not total) success to avoid creating “name collisions”194 – two TLDs that use same
character string.  They have also avoided creating TLDs that conflict with legacy root, since users of the
alternate root namespace also use the legacy root.  Because ICANN does not recognize the existence of
the alternate roots, however, it has no compunction about approving TLDs that use a string already in use
in an alternate root.   Thus, for example, ICANN accepted and debated applications for the .web TLD
from parties other than IODesign, which has been running it as an alternate root since 1996,195 although it
chose not to assign that name to anyone.  ICANN did, however, assign the .biz string to NeuLevel when
there was already a very small functioning alternate root by that name.196  In the view of the original .biz’s
partisans that makes ICANN the “name collider”; whoever is right, both names cannot be in the same root,
                                                
192    There might also be administrative costs to ICANN associated with new TLDs.  ICANN has clearly found it difficult
to negotiate contracts with the new TLDs, some of which have to date taken nine months more than originally
envisioned; large numbers of TLDs might have staffing implications.
193    See generally Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ.
Rev. 424 (1985); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Calif. L. Rev.
479 (1998).
194    See infra  text at note .
195    See Image Online Design, FAQ, https://www.webtld.com/info_faq.asp .
196    See ICANNWatch.org, .biz Is Tiny -- or Is It (June 19, 2001), for competing accounts of the size and viability of the
‘alternate’ and pre-existing .biz.
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forcing alternate root operators to choose, for the first time, whether to abandon one of their own or to offer
data conflicting with that used by the legacy root rather than simply supplemental to it.  Whatever the rights
and wrongs of all this, it demonstrates that ICANN has a strong competitive effect on alternate TLDs with
which its new entries to the root collide.
How would an essential facilities claim fare under this new structure?  It seems clear that ICANN
controls access to the system by which the overwhelming majority of registrants obtain domain names.  At
the same time, the existence of alternate roots may make it less likely that ICANN actually controls access
to a facility essential to competition.  If the barriers to duplicating -- or more likely, supplementing -- the
root are not extraordinary, an essential facilities claim will founder on the first and second elements. 
Network effects may make it more difficult to set up a competing root that draws many customers.  But
they will not make it impossible.197  Further, even if the legacy root is essential at the root level, ICANN
is not vertically integrated.  Thus, even if ICANN’s actions are consistent with a view that it seeks to punish
anyone that tries to compete with it by running an alternate root, ICANN lacks the clear self-dealing
incentive present in cases like MCI and Otter Tail because ICANN gets no direct financial benefit from
choosing one registry over another.
A second problem with the essential facilities theory concerns the feasibility of providing access to
the facility to everyone on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.  If ICANN’s concerns about the
stability of a DNS with multiple gTLDs have any basis,198 an essential facilities claim will founder on this
fourth element.  Even if those concerns are overstated, courts may well decide to defer to ICANN’s
expertise on the issue rather than take a chance with the stability of the domain name system.  As a result,
even if ICANN is determined to control access to an essential facility, we are skeptical that courts will
require it to open that facility to all comers because of concerns that doing so would be impractical. 
In short, it is unlikely that the legacy root will be determined an essential facility to which ICANN
must provide access on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.  This doesn’t mean that ICANN will avoid
liability for specific anticompetitive conduct, however; we discuss those issues in the sections that follow.
C. ICANN’s Decision to Limit gTLDs and Restrict Registries
                                                
197   For an early discussion, see Lemley & McGowan, Network Effects, at 555 n.323:
Unlikely is not impossible, however. There are some reasons to believe that even here, network effects might
not prevent effective competition between standards. First, the switch to a new domain name system need not
be a complex one. NSI cannot claim to own the basic protocols that govern the Internet. It might be relatively
straightforward, therefore, for a concerted group of large Internet users to switch their allegiance in a public way,
causing others to follow suit. Second, and more important, it might be possible to run a new DNS system
alongside the existing one, so that a company could be on both systems at once. If this is feasible, IBM could
be accessed through ibm.com via NSI, and through a different (or conceivably even the same) domain name on
a different system. Which system a user used would depend on how she accessed the Net. Lock-in concerns
are significantly alleviated to the extent that users can simultaneously use more than one standard, as we have
seen.
198   We discuss this issue in detail in the next section.
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ICANN’s decision to limit the number of new gTLDs created an artificial scarcity of domain names.
 It also limited the number of companies who could be registries, since the DNS as we know it assumes that
there will be only one registry for each gTLD.  ICANN’s method of choosing registries presents rather
serious antitrust issues.199  ICANN’s application document for would-be new gTLD registries,200 and
especially the accompanying "Criteria for Assessing TLD Proposals,"201 made it clear that parties who dealt
with ICANN’s competitors would be rejected -- even though those competitors’ market share was almost
trivial.202 ICANN warned applicants that they must "demonstrate specific and well-thought-out plans,
backed by ample, firmly committed resources, to operate in a manner that preserves the Internet's
continuing stability. The introduction of the proposed TLD should not disrupt current operations, nor should
it create alternate root systems, which threaten the existence of a globally unique public name space."203
 ICANN’s demand that all applicants for approval as a new gTLD registry first forswear ‘alternate roots’
is an exclusive dealing requirement.
Exclusive dealing arrangements are suspect under the antitrust laws because when entered into by
a firm with a significant share of the market, they may foreclose options to competitors, driving them from
the market entirely or raising their costs.204  For example, a dominant manufacturer may be able to “lock
up” a large number of retail outlets by demanding that those outlets deal exclusively to it.  As a result,
competing manufacturers may find it difficult or impossible to place their goods in retail stores. 
Not all or even most exclusive deals are anticompetitive, however.  Exclusive dealing arrangements
can also serve the useful purpose of guaranteeing a manufacturer an ongoing source of supply or a
continuing outlet for distribution.  This in turn permits the manufacturer to make investments on a long-term
basis.  It may also facilitate quality control and monitoring of sales outlets by the manufacturer.205  As a
result, exclusive dealing arrangements are judged under the rule of reason.206  They are illegal only if the firm
insisting on the agreement has a sufficient share of the market that the agreement will foreclose a significant
                                                
199   For a related concern, that competition among gTLDs is still minimal, see Kesan & Shah, supra  note __, at 198-200.
200   http://www.icann.org/tlds/new-tld-application-instructions-15aug00.htm
201   http://www.icann.org/tlds/tld-criteria-15aug00.htm
202   http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-3-background/response-to-new.net-09jul01.htm.  See also  ICANN Chief Issues
Statement Criticizing Existence of Alternative Domain Name Roots, 6 Elec. Comm. & L. Rpt. 587 (2001).
203   Id.
204   For a general discussion of the competitive risks of exclusive dealing arrangements, see XI Areeda & Hovenkamp
¶ 1801.
205   See id. ¶ 1802.
206   Exclusive dealing arrangements in goods are governed by section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14.  Because
registries provide services, not goods, the relevant law is provided by section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.  But
the legal standards are largely the same in any event.  See generally XI Philip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Law ¶ 1800c4-c5.
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amount of competition.  Even then, the agreement can be justified if the defendant can show procompetitive
benefits that outweigh any foreclosure.207
Whether ICANN’s exclusive dealing requirement is legal depends on ICANN’s market power and
on whether the exclusive dealing requirement is on balance pro- or anticompetitive. ICANN unquestionably
has control over the legacy root. Virtually all gTLDs (measured by use) are under ICANN’s effective
control, and ICANN’s control over access to the legacy-root server creates rather substantial barriers to
entry to alternate roots.  Estimates of how many people use alternate roots vary, but the numbers of people
using true alternate name resolution services is probably well under 1% of all Internet users, and the number
of domain name registrants in the true alternate roots was very small indeed.  Even today, what is presumed
to be the largest ‘alternate’ registry, .web, boasts only about 26,000 registrations.208  The small take-up is
hardly surprising, given that the alternate roots suffer from a classic network effect,209 and that a registration
in an alternate root is of relatively little value in the absence of a critical mass of fellow users able to resolve
the name.  The existence of this network effect, coupled with ICANN’s control over the dominant root,
makes ICANN’s exclusive deal particularly effective.  By denying alternate roots the right to participate in
running gTLDs in the legacy root, ICANN keeps those alternate roots marginalized, and makes it far less
likely that they will ever achieve that critical mass.  The foreclosure in question here is not substantial in
percentage terms simply because ICANN’s control is so complete.210  But it effectively forecloses the most
likely source of competition for ICANN’s legacy root.
Understanding the competitive significance of ICANN’s requirement that applicants demonstrate
that their systems would not be compatible with "alternate root systems" requires a short detour into DNS
architecture.  Recall that ICANN gets its power from its control over a key Internet chokepoint -- the
content of the legacy root file.  Users can try to avoid the effects of this chokepoint by using so-called
"alternate roots": rather than getting their name resolution service from a member of the legacy root hierarchy
they instead get DNS service from someone else who gets her data from a different root file with more or
different entries.
At the time ICANN was choosing among the applicants for new gTLDs, the most commonly
deployed type of alternate root were super-sets of the legacy root.211  These alternate DNS services, such
as the ORSC, either cache the legacy root’s data or route queries to it when users seek to resolve a domain
                                                
207   See, e.g., Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 334 (1961); XI Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 1801i.  For
criticism of the balancing approach, and suggested alternatives, see id. at ¶ 1822b.
208    http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=212 .
209   On the role of network effects in cementing the control of the legacy root, see Lemley & McGowan, supra   note __,
at 553-55.
210   The absence of a significant foreclosure percentage often dooms exclusive dealing claims.  See XI Areeda &
Hovenkamp ¶ 1821d1.  But the defendant rarely has the almost complete control over the market that ICANN has in this
case.  We do not think that ICANN’s success in dominating the market renders its reliance on exclusive dealing
arrangements less problematic.
211   A subsequent entrant to the non-ICANN domain name market actually offers a service that is a complex blend of
legacy and alternate root services.  See infra  text at (discussing New.net).
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name in, say, .com.  But where legacy root servers would give an error message for lighting.faq, or
law.web, these services send the queries to private registries that operate without the Department of
Commerce’s imprimatur.  Most of the alternate roots in operation belong to a loose cooperative network
that works on first-come-first-served principles; this cooperative encourages peering and minimizes, but
does not entirely eliminate,212 the problem of "colliders" -- two or more registries claiming to be the
authoritative source of registrations in a particular TLD.213
 ICANN’s action to foreclose any chance that new gTLD registries would in any way assist the
alternate roots obviously benefited ICANN itself.  ICANN’s authority and revenues flow from its contracts
with registrars and registries.  By ensuring that the alternate roots remain shut out from the biggest players,
ICANN exacerbates the network effects that keep its primary competition small.214  Registries in the
ICANN system who would not be interoperating with alternate roots also benefit, since they are protected
from that competition.   On the other hand, registrars and customers lose out, since there are fewer domain
names to sell, and less competition between registries.  The exclusive dealing requirement therefore seems
anticompetitive on its face.
Exclusive dealing arrangements entered into by monopolists that foreclose significant competition
are presumptively illegal.  Even so, the defendant will escape antitrust liability if it can demonstrate a
legitimate procompetitive justification for its behavior.  In this case, whether ICANN can make such a
showing will depend on the technical merits of its argument that alternate roots create instability.215
The case for ICANN’s technical rationalization of its policy against alternate roots relies on the
weight of establishment technical opinion, especially the opinion of the influential Internet Architecture Board
(IAB).  There is, however, a case to be made that the rationale is pretextual.  Proponents of alternate roots
certainly disagree with it; and ICANN’s own protocol standards body recently refused to endorse the IAB
opinion.  ICANN’s response towards its first vigorous competitor, new.net, has been very aggressive.
The technical case against alternate roots rests in large part on the belief that domain names should
always resolve to the same resource216 regardless of who is accessing it and where they are located.  If
                                                
212   For an example of an alternate root operator who runs colliding TLDs, see  Sarah Ferguson, Casting a Wider Net,
Village Voice (Apr. 10, 2001)  (profiling Paul Garrin of Name.space),
http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0114/ferguson.php
213   Until now there have been no alternate roots open to the public that carry data conflicting with the legacy root.  Thus,
when a user of an alternate root types a name in .com, .edu or .uk, that user gets the same IP number as does a user of
the legacy root.  However, the recent introduction of a .biz TLD may change that.  Many of the existing alternate roots
use a root file that points to a small .biz registry operated by Atlantic Root Network, http://www.biztld.net/.  If they persist
in doing so after the ICANN-sponsored .biz goes live, the supersets will become conflicting sets.
214   See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 479, 553
(1998).
215   See supra  note 94 (Cerf comments); cf. Brian Carpenter, IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root,
http://www.iab.org/iab/IAB-Technical-Comment.txt.
216   Usually, but not always, a resource at a single IP number.
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competing roots have name collisions for a TLD, i.e. if there is more than one registry for a given TLD
taking competing registrations which are then reflected in different DNS name resolution hierarchies, then
this uniqueness is lost.  Instead, of everyone seeing the same site when they typed www.kafka.law into their
browser, results will vary. What results a user will get will ordinarily depend on someone’s choice, but that
someone may be the user, or someone upstream from the user, depending on who selects the DNS.  So
far, however, the main consequence of alternate roots is that they create a need either for user education,
or for the DNS equivalent of area codes.  In a world of thriving competitive roots with name collisions,
however, even users who controls their DNS service sometimes might experience unexpected results if, for
example, they were to use a web-based e-mail form to send mail.  Mail to fred@kafka.law on fred’s
machine might go somewhere different than email to that address sent from somewhere else. Indeed, to the
extent that Internet services rely on intermediate machines for their transport via domain names rather than
IP numbers, the routing of the data may vulnerable to any routing errors induced by inconsistent DNS
resolution en route.
None of these dangers occur, however, in the absence of TLD name collisions. A merely
supplementary alternate root does not present the same dangers, so long as there are no name collisions
within it either.  Even here, however, users may be frustrated if, much like a person trying to reach a new.net
TLD from the legacy root today, they click on a link and get an error message because their DNS does not
recognize the existence of the supplementary TLD.
An additional, potentially more serious, problem is ‘cache poisoning’, which can occur without TLD
name collisions, and indeed without alternate roots.  The DNS uses a number of shortcuts to allow DNS
servers to cache data and quickly resolve domain names to IP numbers. So-called cache poisoning occurs
when some of the extra data sent along in response to a DNS resolution query points somewhere other than
where the operator of the DNS resolver expects.  ICANN argued that the increase in the use of alternate
roots might worsen the problem.217 
The significance of these various technical factors remains controversial.  In May, 2000, the Internet
Architecture Board, which functions as the IETF’s steering committee weighed in against alternate roots,
stating in RFC 2826,
To remain a global network, the Internet requires the existence of a globally unique public name space.
 The DNS name space is a hierarchical name space derived from a single, globally unique root. This is a technical
constraint inherent in the design of the DNS. Therefore it is not technically feasible for there to be more than
one root in the public DNS.  That one root must be supported by a set of coordinated root servers administered
by a unique naming authority.
Put simply, deploying multiple public DNS roots would raise a very strong possibility that users of
different ISPs who click on the same link on a web page could end up at different destinations, against the will
of the web page designers.218
M. Stuart Lynn’s paper for ICANN echoed this language.219 
                                                
217   See M. Stuart Lynn, “ICP-3” http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-3.htm
218   IAB, RFC 2826, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2826.txt
219   See Lynn, supra  note 217.
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Ordinarily, a paper from the IAB would be considered all but authoritative.  Nevertheless,
supporters of alternate roots attacked RFC 2826 as political, and noted that as it was labeled
“Informational” it had not been subjected to the IETF’s consensus building processes. Subsequently, others
proposed ways of organizing alternate roots with a degree of coordination that, they argue, would not create
the problems which worry the IAB,220 although their proposals have not been adopted by the IETF, and
indeed the IETF has apparently refused to allow them to proceed to discussion.  Most recently, ICANN’s
own Protocol Supporting Organization (PSO) was asked to opine on RFC 2826’s condemnation of
alternate roots.  It refused to endorse it, instead issuing the an artful (draft) statement:
The Internet DNS currently operates using a Single Authoritative Root Server System. Although, it would be
technically possible to devise and standardize a fully compliant alternative multiple root server system, there
appears no technical reason for changing from the present working system, as this would require the
development of a new set of protocols for use by the DNS.221
The PSO’s statement is artful because the “new set of protocols” to which it refers might mean any
one of three things. In theory, the new protocols might be primarily social rather than technical: ICANN
might find a way to co-exist with alternate roots and agree to avoid name collisions.  Or, radically
decentralizing technical protocols might be created that allowed users, or their software, to select among
multiple roots much like people dial area codes to select among otherwise identical telephone numbers.222
 Or, ICANN could adopt new protocols that added new capabilities to the ICANN’s existing hierarchical
root.  These new capabilities would allow new functions akin to alternate roots, although they would require
new user software and would leave the DNS firmly in ICANN’s control.223
ICANN’s exclusionary conduct towards competitors is exemplified in its treatment of new.net. 
New.net is both more and less than a true alternate root, and today it is perhaps the most visible competitor
for namespace with ICANN.224  New.net markets itself as a source of domains in thirty new English-
language TLDs with names such as .shop, .kids, .law, .xxx, plus a large number of attractive Spanish,
French and Portuguese TLDs.225 
                                                                                                                                                            
220   E.g. S. Higgs, Alternative Roots and the Virtual Inclusive Root (May, 2001), http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
higgs-virtual-root-00.txt; S. Higgs, Root Server Definitions (May, 2001), http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-higgs-
root-defs-01.txt; Karl Auerbach, Delving Into Multiple DNS Roots (MS word file, undated)
http://www.cavebear.com/tmp/multiple-roots.doc
221    http://www.pso.icann.org/PSO_Minutes/PSO-Minutes-4Sep2001.txt
222    See supra  note 220.
223    For example, M. Stuart Lynn’s proposal for experimental alternate roots relies on the use of the creation of new ‘class
identity’ identifiers, and software to resolve the new class(es).  The structure of the DNS, and the hierarchical control over
the root, would remain exactly as it is today.  See M. Stuart Lynn, ICP 3, supra  note 217.
224    On the growth of new.net, see May Wong, Rebel Registry Adds 20 Domain Name Extensions, S.F. Chron., March
6, 2001, at C3; Chris Gaither, New Challenge to Domain Name Registry, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2001, at C10 (noting that
Prodigy now supports new.net).
225    See http://www.new.net
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The registrant of, say, kafka.law at new.net actually receives a dual registration.  In addition to
receiving kafka.law in the New.net DNS, she also receives a registration of kafka.law.new.net in the legacy
root -- a fourth-level sub-domain of new.net.  Since New.net’s .law domain is not in the root, today most
Internet users worldwide who attempt to access kafka.law will get an error message.  New.net attempts
to overcome this, and simulate a genuine legacy TLD, by using a combination of two strategies, one aimed
at Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and one aimed at users.  New.net invites (and perhaps even pays) ISPs
to alter their DNS to include new.net’s TLDs.226  To date new.net claims it has agreements with ISPs with
more than 60 million users, a significant number, but only a fraction of the more than 400 million estimated
Internet users worldwide.227  For everyone else, new.net offers a ‘plug-in’ program that users of popular
browsers can install on their computers.  Once this program is installed it intercepts attempts to access any
new.net TLD (or to email to a new.net address) and adds the “new.net” extension as needed.  Thus, users
of  the plug-in and customers of participating ISPs can browse the both the legacy namespace and the
new.net namespace at will.  For them, www.kafka.law will resolve, and mail to kafka.law will reach its
destination (albeit as kafka.law.new.net in some cases). Difficulties start, however, when the holder of the
kafka.law registration wants to have a person who neither has a participating ISP nor the plug-in write back
or visit her new web site.  They must either type the full legacy address of kafka.law.new.net -- which more
or less defeats the purpose of having the catchy name in the first place -- or be induced to get the plug-in.228
 And if they use a browser or operating for which there is no plug-in, even that is not an option.  Obviously,
new.net is hoping to break through the network effect and get more people to become part of its network.
 Equally obviously, it has yet to work; as one wag put it ‘you don’t see those TLDs on business cards.’
Despite new.net’s limited market penetration, ICANN has singled it out for vituperative criticism
and crafted new policies designed to ensure that potential customers understand their new.net registrations
will never be recognized in the ICANN root.   First, ICANN’s Chief Policy Officer accused new.net of
“breaking the Internet” and “selling snake oil”.229  Then, ICANN’s CEO authored a paper attacking
new.net’s bona fides and legitimacy that he (eventually230) labeled a “discussion draft”.231 Then, without any
                                                                                                                                                            
226    See New.net, Information for ISPs, http://www.new.net/help_isp_info.tp; Aaron Hopkins, Re: new.net: yet another
DNS namespace overlay play, http://www.merit.edu/mail.archives/html/nanog/2001-03/msg00136.html (Mar 7, 2001).
227    See How Many Online? http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html (‘educated guess’ as of Dec.,
2000).
228    See New.net, FAQ, “Can I use my New.net domain names for e-mail?”, http://www.new.net/help_faq.tp#e1.
229    Kevin Murphy, ICANN Strikes Back, Refuses to be Strong-Armed by New.net, Network Briefing Daily: Issue ,
July 12, 2001, http://www.softwareuncovered.com/news/nbd-20010712.html (comments of ICANN Chief Policy Officer
Andrew McLaughlin);  http://www.icann.org/correspondence/schecter-letter-to-icann-16jul01.htm.
230    There was some initial confusion on this as ICANN initially published the paper on its web page without any sign
that it was a draft, a personal statement, or for discussion.  After a brief storm of protest, ICANN added a preface from
ICANN CEO M. Stuart Lynn saying it was his attempt “to restate existing policy and the technical basis for such policy.”
 See ICANN's Lynn on alternative roots, ICANNWatch.org, http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=180.
231    http://www.icann.org/stockholm/unique-root-draft.htm
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warning, ICANN announced that a slightly revised version of the paper was official ICANN policy, and
that no ‘bottom-up’ discussions were required because the paper merely ‘restated’ long-standing policy
rather than making it.232  In fact, however, the paper contained a number of new policies designed to make
clear to the Internet community that ICANN had no intention of allowing new.net domains into the root,
and indeed would feel very free to create colliding TLDs if and when it chose.  These conclusions were both
novel and controversial, and a reconsideration request to ICANN is currently pending.233
ICANN needed a new policy because new.net presents a substantial potential threat to ICANN’s
monopoly over the TLD namespace.   Were new.net to achieve critical mass in a TLD, ICANN’s would
find it difficult to create a colliding TLD without facing accusations that it, as the latecomer to that name, was
the one ‘breaking the Internet’ by creating name conflicts for a substantial installed base of users.  Worse
from ICANN’s point of view, new.net has grabbed some of the most popular TLDs (often after asking
potential users to vote on which TLDs they’d like to see created).  From ICANN’s perspective as a self-
described guardian of the public trust, it is wrong to allow an entrepreneur to grab whatever attractive
names it wants rather than taking its chances along with other applicants to ICANN.234  And indeed,
new.net has chosen many TLDs that collide with longstanding ‘true’ alternate roots. 
ICANN’s reaction to New.net has been very different from its treatment of non-ASCII
internationalized domain names, a development that poses at least as great a risk of non-unique domain
names, at least from the users’ perspective.  ICANN has supported efforts to create non-ASCII domain
names despite the market’s adoption of competing encoding conventions. Currently these competing would-
be standards amount to a series of parallel (i.e. alternate) domain name spaces.  They differ from alternate
roots in two ways.  First, the internationalized domain name encoding schemes are usually labeled ‘testbeds’
and ‘experiments’; ICANN takes the view that once a single standard emerges from the relevant standards
                                                                                                                                                            
232   See http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-3-background/lynn-statement-09jul01.htm; see also Jonathan Weinberg. How
ICANN Policy Is Made, http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=241.
233   See http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=286 (describing request from Jonathan Weinberg and Michael
Froomkin).
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M. Stuart Lynn, supra  note 217.
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body, all the competing encoding schemes should conform to the standard.235  As these alternate encoding
schemes are being widely deployed and sold, however, there is a real potential for the creation of de facto
competing and colliding name spaces in non-romance character sets.  A second difference is technical: non-
ASCII coding schemes involve using some program to transliterate characters (e.g. Kanji) to a set of ASCII
characters before sending a DNS request to resolve a domain name.  Thus, the actual domain name
registration remains an ASCII-character registration in the ICANN-controlled root.  While the domain
names may be ‘alternate’ and even ‘conflicting’ in the eye of the beholder, from ICANN’s perspective they
remain ‘unique’ and under its ultimate control.
It is not clear how courts would evaluate all of this in the context of an exclusive dealing antitrust
claim.  On the one hand, it is well-established that only procompetitive arguments may be considered as
legitimate business justifications.  ICANN is not free to argue that its foreclosure of competition was a good
thing because competition itself is undesirable.236  On the other hand, courts are willing to consider certain
justifications for the regularization of competition in circumstances in which a market might not otherwise
form. Thus, in BMI v. CBS,237 the Court permitted a copyright owners cartel that provided licenses to
millions of songs at a single flat rate.  The Court reasoned that the cartel itself was procompetitive, since it
eliminated transactions costs that would otherwise be prohibitive, and effectively “made” a new market.
 Similarly, some courts have permitted stock exchanges and trade associations to set up internal rules
governing who can participate and excluding outsiders where such rules were necessary to let the market
function effectively.238  Such restrictions are not always permitted, however, and the courts will inquire in
detail into whether the restriction on competition is actually necessary.239
It is not clear whether the desire for DNS uniformity justifies ICANN’s exclusion of alternate roots
from the list of potential registries.  Certainly, the antitrust cases suggest that ICANN’s asserted
justifications will be subject to searching scrutiny on their merits.
                                                
235   See ICANN, Board Resolution on Multi-Lingual Domain Names (Sep. 25, 2000),
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D. The Uniformity of the UDRP
Competition is not only about selling goods or services at the lowest price.  For competition to be
free and unfettered, companies must be able to compete as well on the nature and quality of the products
they sell.  Competition in the breakfast cereal industry, for example, requires not just that many different
companies produce corn flakes, but that different companies be free to experiment with different types of
cereal.  Companies in that industry clearly establish market niches in part on their willingness to serve
different types of customers with different types of cereals. 
So too with goods or services of any type, including domain names.  Registrars in a competitive
marketplace will attempt to take business away from each other not only by lowering their price, but also
by offering different and better services than their competition.  Because the registrars’ customers are
domain name registrants, registrars in a competitive market might be expected to compete by offering rights
or benefits that make their domain names more valuable.  Among the things that registrars would compete
over are the way, speed, and skill with which they would resolve domain name trademark disputes.  Indeed,
those registrars that predate ICANN had different policies for dealing with such disputes.
The UDRP short-circuited this competition.  ICANN required all registrars to agree to impose a
uniform dispute resolution policy on their registrants.  By doing so, ICANN entered into a vertical
agreement restricting non-price competition on one axis.  This in and of itself is not necessarily an antitrust
problem.  Manufacturers regularly impose non-price restraints on their distributors or retailers; doing so may
legitimately serve to prevent free riding and is normally legal.240 
More troubling is the means by which the UDRP was adopted.  ICANN did not develop the
UDRP itself and impose it on the registrars.  Rather, a group of registrars themselves banded together and
drafted the initial provisions with input from intellectual property owners.  These registrars then collectively
presented the draft to ICANN, which adopted it with only minor changes.  Thus, it appears that the UDRP
was not in fact merely a vertical agreement imposed by ICANN on its customers, but actually reflects a
horizontal agreement among the registrars themselves to limit competition in dispute resolution procedures.
 Horizontal agreements are much more worrisome, particularly where (as here) they are entered into by the
largest companies in the market.241  ICANN appears not to have been the driving force in drafting the
policy, but rather a “ringmaster” employed by the registrars to enforce their own agreement.242  The issue
is more complicated, however, because the registrars in turn have no direct incentive to insist on uniform
dispute resolution.  Rather, they were motivated by pressure from the trademark owners, backed by the
threat of lawsuits and a fear that the trademark constituency could prevent both registrar competition and
the development of new gTLDs altogether. Michael Palage, the head of the Registrars’ DNSO
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Constituency, famously said, "The trademark lobby must be placated because of its potential ability and
inclination to bankrupt new registrars and wreck havoc on their registrant databases."243 
Horizontal agreements to restrict non-price competition are not necessarily illegal per se.  Rather,
they will be given a “quick look” to determine whether there are legitimate procompetitive justifications for
the agreement.  Here, the obvious purpose of the agreement is to limit cybersquatting.  There is strong
evidence that the UDRP was enacted at the behest of intellectual property owners who likely had the
political power to prevent the adoption of any new gTLDs unless the registrars agreed to restrict
cybersquatters.  Certainly the effect of the UDRP has been to punish cybersquatters, in part by establishing
procedures that have systematically favored intellectual property owners even in doubtful cases.244  But even
granting that cybersquatting is a bad thing, collusion among erstwhile competitors to treat it uniformly is not
necessarily legal.  The Supreme Court has made it clear that justifications for horizontal agreements must
be procompetitive, not just good social policy.  It has rejected justifications for cartels based on the idea
that competition itself will lead to bad results.245  Here, the clear effect of the UDRP is to eliminate
competition that otherwise would have existed between registrars about how to resolve disputes.  That
competition may well have been undesirable as a matter of social policy.246  But as a matter of antitrust law,
it doesn’t matter.  There does not seem to be the sort of market-making necessity for the UDRP that
ICANN has asserted as a justification for excluding alternate roots.247
                                                
243    See Judith Oppenheimer, Adventive, http://www.judithoppenheimer.com/pressetc/adentive.html (quoting remark
by Palage at a January 10, 2000 Small Business Administration meeting on Domain Name Issues).
244   For empirical evidence that this has happened, see Michael Geist, Fair.com?  An Examination of the Allegations of
Systematic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP (working paper 2001) (http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~geist/geistudrp.pdf); Milton
Mueller, Rough Justice: An Analysis of ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (working paper 2000)
(http://dcc.syr.edu/roughjustice.htm).
245   See, e.g., National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978) (“The early cases
also foreclose the argument that because of the special characteristics of a particular industry, monopolistic arrangements
will better promote trade and commerce than competition. That kind of argument is properly addressed to Congress and
may justify an exemption from the statute for specific industries, but it is not permitted by the Rule of Reason.”).
246   There is a great deal of academic debate over whether certain forms of regulatory competition result in a “race to the
bottom,” in which regulatory regimes are rewarded for being inefficiently lax.  See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin,
The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the
Bottom" , 54 Vand. L. Rev. 231, 237 (2001); Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (1993); Ehud Kamar,
A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1908 (1998);
 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Texas L.
Rev. 469 (1987). While registrars are not governments, one might reasonably fear a similar effect in a competitive regime,
since registrants (registrars’ customers) might prefer not to be subject to any sort of dispute resolution scheme at all, but
rather to externalize any costs of their trademark infringement.
       The matter is complicated in this case by the fact that the U.S. Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), the same month the UDRP was adopted.  Thus, dispute resolution competition among
registrars would have been limited in any event by the legal backstop; trademark owners were and remain free to go to
court rather than use any private dispute resolution system.
247   See supra  notes __-__ and accompanying text.
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ICANN’s liability for adopting the UDRP is related to antitrust concerns about its policy on
alternate roots as well.  Alternate roots are not subject to the UDRP because they have not contracted with
ICANN.  They therefore constitute a potential source of competition in registration policies, one that
ICANN is foreclosing.  Thus, neither policy should be considered in isolation.
If the standardized UDRP agreement is illegal, ICANN is liable regardless of whether it was the
motivating force behind the policy.  Even reluctant or coerced co-conspirators violate the antitrust laws by
entering into the conspiracy.248  Further, the standard-setting cases seem to suggest that standard-setting
organizations themselves violate the antitrust laws even if their processes are hijacked by interested
participants.249  But the more likely defendants in a UDRP claim are the registrars who collectively drafted
and implemented it.  We turn to their possible liability in the next section.
IV. Liability for Petitioning ICANN
In addition to the state action and governmental immunity doctrines, private actors who petition the
government in the effort to influence it to act are immune from antitrust liability even if the actions they seek
are anticompetitive.  This “Noerr-Pennington” immunity250 creates a sort of penumbra around the state
action doctrine in which anticompetitive petitioning may take place without antitrust liability.  The
fundamental basis for this petitioning immunity is the First Amendment right to petition.251  As Justice Scalia
put it, it would be “peculiar in a democracy, and perhaps in derogation of the constitutional right ‘to petition
the government for a redress of grievances’ . . . to establish a category of lawful state action that citizens
are not permitted to urge.”252  Efforts to petition the government are immune from antitrust liability unless
those efforts amount to no more than a “sham.”253
In this case, though, registrars, registrants and trademark owners are not petitioning the government
itself.  Rather, they are petitioning ICANN, a private corporation acting under the authorization of the
                                                
248   Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 682 (9th Cir.) ("The involuntary nature of one's
participation in a conspiracy to monopolize is no defense."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); cf. MCM Partners Inc. v.
Andrews-Bartlett & Assocs., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing the Supreme Court in United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948), and thirteen other cases, to support its holding that a Section 1 conspiracy "is not
negated by the fact that one or more of the co-conspirators acted unwillingly, reluctantly, or only in response to
coercion").
249   See, e.g., American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (ASME violated
antitrust laws where a member sent a threatening letter to one of its competitors on ASME letterhead, even though the
member acted without actual authority in sending the letter).
250   See, e.g., Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
251   On the source of petitioning immunity, see McGowan & Lemley, supra  note __, at 307-14.
252   City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991).
253   See Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
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government.  There is of course no immunity for “petitioning” a purely private entity; were it otherwise,
cartels and other agreements between competitors would all be immune.254  But petitioning ICANN is
perhaps an intermediate case, since ICANN’s existence is authorized by governmental policy, and there
is a plausible argument that it is a state actor for antitrust purposes.255  The closest analogue is Allied Tube
& Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head Inc.,256 which involved efforts to influence the National Fire Protection
Association, a private standard-setting body whose model codes were routinely enacted into law unchanged
by state legislatures.257  The Court held that Allied Tube was not immune from liability for petitioning the
NFPA because the NFPA lacked the public accountability of a truly governmental body:
Whatever de facto authority the Association enjoys, no official authority has been conferred on it
by any government, and the decisionmaking body of the Association is composed, at least in part,
of persons with economic incentives to restrain trade. . . . [W]here, as here, the restraint is imposed
by persons unaccountable to the public and without official authority, many of whom have personal
financial interests in restraining competition, we have no difficulty concluding that the restraint has
resulted from private action.258 
To the extent that ICANN lacks public accountability,259 has no official authority,260 and has a financial
interest to restrain competition,261 it is a private body and those who petition it will enjoy no special
immunity.262
As with the state action doctrine, merely determining that immunity does not apply is only the
                                                
254   See, e.g., Raymond Ku, Antitrust Immunity, the First Amendment, and Settlements: Defining the Boundaries of the
Right to Petition, 33 Ind. L. Rev. 385 (2000).
255   As noted above, however, we ultimately find that argument unpersuasive.  See supra  notes __-__ and accompanying
text.
256   486 U.S. 492 (1988).
257   Id. at 495.
258   Id. at 501-02.
259   Many arguments have been made along these lines.  See, e.g., Froomkin, supra  note 5; Liu, supra  note 7.
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261   See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text (describing ICANN’s benefit from restraining competition by alternate
roots).  ICANN seems to lack a similar financial incentive to enforce the UDRP, except to the extent its adoption placates
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262  See also  Sessions Tank Liners v. Joor Mfg. Co., 17 F.3d 295 (9th Cir. 1994) (misrepresentations to a quasi-public
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beginning of the inquiry.  Courts must still apply the normal principles of antitrust law to determine whether
the act of petitioning is itself anticompetitive.  If the petitioners are the registrars seeking to have ICANN
impose a uniform UDRP, that analysis was conducted above.  Alternatively, one might suggest that certain
trademark owners themselves were liable for petitioning ICANN to help them out by setting favorable
dispute resolution rules.  The problem with this theory is that trademark owners aren’t really “competing”
in any relevant market; they simply want the rules changed in a way that is more favorable to them.
More generally, if private actors do not enjoy petitioning immunity for their contacts with ICANN,
they will have to take more care than they have to date to conform their behavior to the requirements of
antitrust law.  Groups of registrars, registries, or potential registries must take particular care about agreeing
together on a course of conduct; section 1 of the Sherman Act imposes greater restrictions on horizontal
agreements to restrict trade than the restrictions on unilateral conduct we have discussed so far.
V. Policy Implications
By delegating policy-making authority to ICANN, a private actor, without putting in place any real
mechanisms for accountability, the government has created some unanticipated legal problems.  It seems
clear that the government itself could operate the legacy root in a way that excludes alternate roots without
violating the antitrust laws.  Similarly, the government should be able to impose a uniform domain name
dispute resolution policy on registrars and registrants without antitrust liability.263  It could also delegate these
tasks to a private entity like ICANN without antitrust liability if the government affirmatively set the policy
and actively supervised ICANN’s implementation of it. Under Noerr and the government immunity
doctrines, the price of unsupervised delegation is antitrust scrutiny.  And it is not clear that ICANN and
those in a position to influence it will survive that scrutiny.  To avoid antitrust liability, ICANN will have to
consider carefully both its policy regarding alternate roots and likely its uniform dispute resolution policy as
well.  These policies are not necessarily illegal, but ICANN will have to offer evidence that they are on
balance good for competition – something that to date it has not been obliged to do.  At a minimum,
ICANN’s policies will be subject to increased scrutiny, and likely to protracted antitrust litigation.
This may not be a desirable result as a policy matter.  There are plausible reasons to concentrate
control of the root in one entity.  Decentralized roots increase the chance of collisions or incompatibilities
between TLDs operated by different entities.  While there may be decentralized solutions to this problem,
it is a risk that we might decide is not worth taking.  Similarly, the UDRP performs a function many value:
it gives trademark owners and domain name registrants a cheap and quick way to resolve disputes over
alleged cybersquatting.  The astonishing number of UDRP proceedings to date – over 4,000 – is a
testament both to the continuing seriousness of the issue and the relative cost and speed of the UDRP
compared to judicial action.264  The UDRP has problems – it may not give respondents enough process or
                                                
263   As one of us has noted elsewhere, however, the nature of the UDRP might raise constitutional concerns if compelled
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gather enough information, and there is recent evidence that it is systematically biased in favor of trademark
owners.265  But we might decide that a cheap and rapid dispute resolution system is worth giving up some
certainty that the outcomes are correct.
The problem, though, is that as it stands presently “we” don’t get to make any such decision. 
Whether to allow alternate roots, and how to design a domain name dispute resolution policy, are important
policy questions.  They may be decisions we ought to leave to the market, an approach that would allow
alternate roots and would permit registrars to design non-uniform dispute resolution policies.  Alternatively,
the government may decide that it should displace the market outcome in the interest of ensuring the stability
of the Internet or dealing with the problem of cybersquatting.266  In either case, the decision will have been
made by an institution that is accountable to the public in some form – either the market, in which consumers
can “vote with their wallet,” or the government. Accountability is desirable because it permits error
correction.  If it turns out that the UDRP system has structural flaws, for example – as appears to be the
case267 – those flaws can be identified and corrected.  By contrast, government today abdicates this
decision to a private, unelected entity that is also not subject to normal market constraints.  If it turns out
that ICANN makes the wrong decision, there is currently nothing to be done. 
The government should take a more active role in setting domain name policy, either by running the
DNS itself, or by actively supervising its delegates, or by making an affirmative decision to let the market
work unfettered.  If the government won’t step in to do one of these things, ICANN and those who deal
with it will find many of their current activities constrained by antitrust rules.
                                                                                                                                                            
265   See supra  note __ (citing such evidence).
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267   See, e.g., Geist, supra  note 151; Mueller, supra  note 151.  Among the more obvious structural problems are the short
time frame for response, which prevents many respondents from answering at all or from retaining a lawyer; the lack of
an appeal procedure; and the fact that complainants get to select the private company that will arbitrate the dispute,
giving those companies every incentive to cater to complainants (trademark owners) in deciding cases.  For more detail
on these procedural deficiencies, see Froomkin, supra  note 5, at 96-101; Froomkin, supra  note 87.
